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Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure
It is apparent to the most casual observer that a great divide sep-
arates the two systems of criminal procedure devised by Western man
over the past eight centuries. When the comparatist turns his view
from the Continent to the English speaking world, he encounters con-
trasts so striking that the great diversity existing within each legal
culture pales in significance. Unfortunately, however, although it is
an easy matter to enumerate countless striking differences between
the two systems, it is far more difficult to investigate the extent to
which these differences in detail can be traced to more fundamental
differences in the way the two systems conceive of the nature of
justice, order, and law itself.
The conventional contrast between the two systems is one that ern-
phasizes the adversarial (or accusatorial) aspects of the Anglo-American
process, and the nonadversarial (or inquisitorial) character of the con-
tinental mode of proceeding. This dichotomy, no matter how refined,
fails to account for many important variations between the two sys-
tems, especially if one's focus moves away from the trial stage, and
if one discards a preoccupation with legal mythology to consider
law as it is actually applied.1
In this article I shall argue that previously inexplicable differences
between the continental and Anglo-American systems can be under-
stood once the conventional trial-centered models are displaced by
another set of organizing concepts. These concepts are intended to
suggest that divergences in procedural arrangements are, to a con-
siderable extent, related to larger divergences in the conception of
the proper organization of authority characteristic of the Continent
and the English-speaking world.
To this end I shall offer two models of authority,2 the hierarchical
I. Notwithstanding the relatively narrow focus of the conventional dichotomy, the rival
procedural types springing from it are variously characterized. I have attempted elsewhere
to trace diverse ways in which the contrast between adversary and nonadversary pro-
cedures can be conceived, and have tried to isolate the opposition most fruitful and
illuminating for comparative analysis. This, I believe, is the contrast between the pro-
cedural structure of trial as a party contest and as an official inquiry. See Damaska,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U. PA. L.
Rav. 506, 554-78 (1973). The trial-centeredness of the polarization creates many problems,
only one of which resides in the fact that the trial is much less crucial a stage in the
continental than in the common law system. One cannot deny, however, that the con-
ventional dichotomy possesses an illuminating force, transcending the trial stage of the
criminal process. See note 109 infra.
2. See notes 6, 74 infra. As cognoscenti will readily notice, my argument is, in a
general way, inspired by a number of Weberian concepts and ideas. Indeed, the hier-
archical model is in many respects an effort to adapt Weber's bureaucratic model to the
particular problems of criminal procedure. The coordinate model, however, has no simple
Weberian analogue. This should not be surprising, given the fact that patterns of authority
characteristic of the Anglo-American system seem to elude Weberian typologies.
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and the coordinate, to illuminate respectively the continental and
the Anglo-American systems. For heuristic purposes, each model is
premised on a very different view of the nature of justice, without
any intention to imply that specific conceptions of justice historically
precede or causally determine particular patterns of organizing au-
thority.
To many tastes, the development and use of procedural models
is an overly abstract scholarly genre. But consider that comparatists
are, in a sense, men without a country; their efforts at comprehen-
siveness, and their separation from the comfortable and the familiar,
necessarily invite a reliance upon the abstract. I concede that there
are levels of analysis at which procedural models are generally mis-
leading stereotypes or lifeless cliches. They are also simplifications;
but this is precisely their default de qualitM, indeed their virtue. They
are used to liberate us from the tyranny of details, so that we can
discern the overall distinguishing attributes of complex phenomena.
They will be as useful as our purposes are precise and well-defined.
Although my models of authority are mainly provisional markers
toward more specific theoretical constructs, I hope to show that even
in this crude form they are useful analytic tools, and possibly pedagog-
ical devices.
In an effort to prove the explanatory power of the two models of
authority, I have chosen numerous examples.3 I do not claim, how-
ever, that they were randomly selected and just happen to be con-
sistent with my constructs. Rather, I tried to use as illustrations
those features common to actual procedures that are of some interest
in themselves. Some, notably those concerning the appellate process,
have not been previously elucidated from a comparative standpoint.
Others, such as prosecutorial discretion, can easily be misunderstood
by commentators, because similar phenomena often subtly change in
the radically divergent climate of the two legal cultures. Finally, some
It is needless to dwell here on the controversy over whether there is a meaningful
difference between ideal types conceived primarily as heuristic devices and models pur-
porting to describe the most general features of empiric phenomena. On Weber's views
concerning ideal types, see M. WEBER, ESSAIS SUR LA THiORIE DE LA SCIENCE 185 (1966); R.
DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 40 (1959). Even if there is
an element of "as-if-ness" about some procedural models, they can still be useful as
illuminating metaphors; cf. A. RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 203 (1953).
3. I make no claims that variables in the polarization represented by my models were
derived in a rigorous methodological fashion. For a perceptive discussion of dangers lurk-
ing in the selection of variables, see Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions
in Society, 8 LAW & Soc'Y Rlv. 217, 240-42 (1974).
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illustrations, such as different degrees of bureaucratization on judi-
cial panels, are offered as striking contrasts between the systems.
Since all these areas that I discuss bristle with technical details,
many of them Lilliputian and deeply bracketed within local con-
texts, I must occasionally use a very broad brush; misgivings about
some rather robust statements will be allayed in the footnotes. More-
over, for brevity's sake, I shall, whenever possible, appeal to the
reader's knowledge in an invitation to rearrange into new configura-
tions what is already known.
I. The Hierarchical Model
A. General Characteristics
1. The Object of Hierarchy
The system of values underlying the hierarchical model is charac-
terized by the high premium placed on certainty of decisionmaking.
This preference directly affects the tradeoffs with other recognized
goals of the criminal justice system, especially the desire to achieve
justice in the special circumstances of each individual case. Whenever
the consideration of individualized circumstances prevents the con-
version of the bases of the particular decision into a general, certain
formula, such consideration must be forgone. 4 If one were to seek
a deeper motivation for this great emphasis on certainty, the atti-
tudinal keynote of the hierarchical model would probably be located
4. This, of course, is the logic of the model. In actual continental systems certainty is
not inflated to an absolute dogma; there are well-recognized situations in which it must
yield to competing values. The reconsideration of finally adjudicated cases in the interest
of justice offers such a counterpoint. It is true, however, that the continental machinery
of criminal justice attributes a significantly greater relative weight to certainty than do
some other systems. On this issue, criminal justice mirrors more general characteristics of
the continental legal system. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION 50-58 (1969).
Merryman is critical of the continental emphasis on certainty, which he claims is much
too abstract. "Like the queen in chess, it can move in any direction." Id. at 50. Note,
however, how differently the problem appears in the continental fabric of beliefs. Par-
ticularized justice is regarded by a continental lawyer as so elusive and endlessly debat-
able that lie would more readily use the chess metaphor in talking about individualized
justice than certainty, which implies the consistent application of a cruder standard. From
this perspective it is better to apply across the board a criterion for decision which is just
in an average case, than to risk floundering in the sea of particulars; at least one has
evenhandedness and uniformity. As we shall see later, the counterassertion of a lawyer
in a conmon law system is that such a position amounts to a quintessentially Procrustean
administration of justice.
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in the rationalist desire to impose a relatively simple order on the
rich complexities of life.
2. The Hierarchical Organization
Certainty in decisionmaking requires that uniform policies be de-
veloped. This is indubitably a centripetal striving, leading quite nat-
urally to the centralization of authority. Thus, incumbents of au-
thority positions have no autonomous powers: authority is only dele-
gated to them and its exercise must be closely watched.
This leads to another derivation from the basic orientations of the
hierarchical model. Any structure of authority organized along its
lines, except the very small ones, is inexorably driven toward rigorous
hierarchical ordering. Three attributes of such ordering are important
for my purposes. The first is a precise delineation of the province
of each official: he must be pinned down to an exact spot determined
in relation to the dominant center. Positions of super- and sub-ordina-
tion must be sharply defined and unmistakable, almost in a reen-
actment of the medieval adage "nul homme sans seigneur." All am-
biguities in hierarchical relations are viewed as a sorry state of af-
fairs to be quickly remedied; duplicate and overlapping spheres of
authority are abhorred. The second attribute of strict ordering is
that authority is allocated along a gradient of importance; the higher
one climbs the "scalar" of hierarchy, the more comprehensive and
important the authority one acquires. Put differently, there is a pro-
nounced inequality among officials on various hierarchical echelons,
especially in terms of the kinds of questions delegated to each for
decision. The third attribute concerns the interrelationship of of-
ficials at the same level, and leads to the separation of office and
incumbent: Where an individual official is delegated authority to
make a decision, the decision can be changed only by hierarchical
superiors. Thus it is binding on all coequal officials, and becomes a
decision of an administrative unit. On the other hand, where a de-
cision is collective, it must express the will of the group as a readily
identifiable object of superior review. The group is transmogrified
into an institution which assumes a life of its own, distinct and apart
from the individuals comprising it.
The more freedom officials retain, the more difficult it becomes
to achieve certainty and uniformity of decisionmaking. Accordingly,
the hierarchical model strives to guide its officials by outcome-de-
termining normative propositions in as many situations as can be
484
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anticipated. The more precise the directives contained in these propo-
sitions, the better. Directives must be sufficiently rigid that they
cannot be altered or evaded when officials applying them feel they lead
to undesirable outcomes. To remedy such regrettable situations is not
the business of officials in the hierarchical model. Yet the desire for
precision and comprehensiveness of normative propositions creates a
difficulty: Precise directives covering wide areas of experience can
easily conflict. Hence there are strong demands in the hierarchical
model for the ordering, systematization and simplification of the
normative universe.
What emerges from this brief description is that the use of "official
discretion" is viewed with disfavor.5 Essentially, the exercise of dis-
cretion represents a necessary evil in the hierarchical model, an evil
to be tolerated so long as more precise guidelines for official action
cannot be formulated.
Intimately linked to the "brooding omnipresence" of hierarchical
review is the great importance attached to official documentation and
bureaucratic techniques. All official decisions must be recorded and
traces of all other official activity preserved for possible supervision by
higher officials. To facilitate the work of the latter, standardization and
formalization of official documents and reports are demanded.
The foregoing features of the hierarchical model influence officials'
perceptions of their roles. Consider, for instance, the ideal of official
decisionmaking: This process is one in which clear directives are
applied to accurately determined facts. The personal views of offi-
cials as to the desirability of the outcome of this process must be
considered irrelevant. Officials are "servants," members of the service
class merely administering normative standards which are supplied
to them. If they were permitted to question these standards and de-
part from them when they deemed it appropriate, the very foundation
of the hierarchical model would be shaken; the certainty and pre-
dictability of official decisions would be endangered. Since few areas
are free from normative intrusion, and since the systematic organiza-
5. Because of the relatively recent debate in Anglo-American legal theory concerning
the meaning of discretion, a definitional remark is in order here. As used in this essay the
term is not limited to situations of full official freedom from the application of norma-
tive standards. It is intended also to cover those situations in which an official is guided
by vague standards, making predictability difficult. Compare Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CM. L. REV. 14, 32-40 (1967), with A. DE LAUBADI-RE, TRAIrfi DE DRoIT AD-
MiNIRxriF 261-62 (6th ed. 1973) (discussing the French concept of pouvoir discrdtionnaire).
Of course, "discretion" appears differently when, rather than used as a point of con-
trast between systems, its uses (and the shortcomings of those uses) are examined within
a single system. See Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S.
CAL. L. REv. 12 (1972).
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tion of normative criteria achieves a degree of insulation from ex-
ternal considerations, the problems involved in decisionmaking ap-
pear essentially as nonpolitical, technical tasks.
What are the most important qualifications for a position in the
official hierarchy? An office holder must be a technical expert capable
of efficiently applying normative standards, irrespective of what in-
terests are thereby served. A good official is also one who has mastered
the bureaucratic skills that permit the smooth functioning of the
hierarchical authority structure. Generating bureaucratic minutiae is
not regarded as an irksome chore, preventing an office holder from
performing more important tasks. Rather, the deft handling of files
and similar bureaucratic techniques are accepted as essential skills
of proficient officials.
Role expectations are reinforced by a variety of mechanisms within
the hierarchical model. Prominent among these mechanisms are the
training for official positions, recruitment techniques, and the system
of promotions. Entry into a strictly ordered officialdom begins at
the lowest rung of the hierarchical ladder. Established people will
seldom be willing to begin at the bottom, and thus an entrant will
typically be a technically skilled young man who has undergone both
systematic instruction in the normative system and practical training
in bureaucratic techniques. His aptitude may be tested by entrance
examinations. Because there is practically no lateral entry to higher
positions, important officials will be those who have ascended the lad-
der of hierarchy through periodic promotions which depend, at least
to some extent, on performance evaluations by one's superiors.
To this cursory sketch of the hierarchical model a few reflections
must be added by way of transition from the description of the
model to its comparison with actual continental systems.6 Of course,
6. The proximity of the hierarchical model to a number of Weberian ideas is obvious.
The aspirations of the model may be viewed as premises underlying the "logically formal
rationality" of legal thought as understood by Weber. The organization of the model
incorporates, both explicitly and by implication, many constituent elements of the "bu-
reaucratic" (or "legal") type of domination (Herrschaft). See Max Weber on Economy
and Society xxxi-xxxiv (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). The most important deviation of the
hierarchical model from Weber's bureaucratic authority is the absence in the former of
the impersonal, detached style of exercising authority. The comparison of modern con-
tinental and Anglo-American system on this score is exceedingly complex and of uncertain
outcome. See note 74 infra.
I have neglected to emphasize the impersonality of orders within the hierarchy, for I
believe that in all bureaucracies a strong feeling of personal dependence remains. Many
will claim that Weber believed that the structure of power determines legal order rather
than vice versa. Because I sketch the hierarchical model as originating in the quest for
certainty and order, I may be interpreted as implying that certain value orientations pre-
cede patterns of authority. I make no such claims. See note 158 infra. For a thoughtful and
very lucid recent discussion of the relationship between political structure and legal
thinking in Weber's work, see Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism,
1972 Wis. L. REv. 720, 731-35.
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discrepancies will exist between the demands of the hierarchical model
and the reality of systems which it approximates.
For example, with respect to official decisionmaking, one cannot
seriously expect that an authority structure can be devised in which
normative propositions completely determine the outcome of deci-
sions. The latter can seldom be complete and inexorable derivations
from normative standards. But even if the ideal of decisionmaking in
the hierarchical model were both logically and psychologically an im-
possibility, this hardly implies that decisionmaking is independent of
variations in the structure of authority or that the folklore developed
by such structures can be relegated to the realm of myths having no
operational significance. Indeed, the relative weight of the normative
variable in the equation of factors determining the actual official
decision seems to change significantly from one type of authority
structure to another.
B. The Hierarchical Model and Continental Reality
At first the scene on the Continent seems too vast and complex
to handle. Important variations can be observed from country to
country, and many factors of diverse origin pull actual systems of
criminal justice away from the hierarchical model to a degree one
cannot easily determine. Nonetheless, a general continental pattern
can be discerned from these features: the strong tendency to arrive
at uniform policies through the centralization of authority; the rigor-
ously hierarchical ordering of agencies participating in the admin-
istration of justice; the preference for precise and rigid normative
directives over more flexible standards; and, finally, the great im-
portance accorded official documentation. This general, bureaucratic
style of exercising authority tends to be sustained everywhere by
chosen methods of training, recruiting and promoting officials. It is
around these foci that my presentation will revolve.
1. Centripetal Decisionmaking
a. Police Forces and Public Prosecutors. It is commonplace that
centralization of both the police and the prosecutorial corps remains
the dominant structural principle of all continental systems.7 Central
7. Continental police forces are usually subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. In
some countries, there are police forces with no organizational unity. Thus, for instance,
some systems assign a segment of the police force to the Ministry of Justice, and it is
only this segment which is entitled to participate in the criminal process. The rest of the
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 480, 1975
authorities issue binding general directives to local officials and can
give specific instructions on the handling of a particular case.8 Even
where, sporadically, a degree of local independence is cultivated, local
police and prosecutors are far from being important local potentates.
Although the federal system of some continental countries may oc-
casionally lead to the absence of organizational unity on the national
level, strong forces are at work to coordinate law enforcement among
federal units and establish uniform national policies.9
b. The Judiciary. Turning to the continental judiciary, the pic-
ture becomes much more complex because of cross-currents and off-
setting tendencies. I shall first consider those characteristics of the
judicial organization that accord with the hierarchical model, and that
deal with features that seem to deviate from it.
There are in the continental judicial systems'0 two decisive weap-
police remain under the Ministry of the Interior. This is, essentially, the French pattern
of division between the "judicial" (law enforcement) and "administrative" (peacekeeping)
branches of the police force. See G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, PROeDURE PiNALE 347-68
(2d ed. 1962). Even in this case, however, police forces are ultimately responsible to an
important member of the central government. Attempts have been made to transplant a
decentralized pattern of police organization to countries with a different tradition; most
of these experiments, however, have failed. See, e.g., Nakahara, The Japanese Police, 46
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 583 (1955) (Japanese experience with American ideas).
Continental offices of public prosecution are strictly centralized. For the French Min-
istare Public, see G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, supra, at 460. True, there is the oft-pro-
claimed freedom of the French prosecutor to deviate from directives of his superiors in
his oral arguments in court; but this folkloric proclamation has been termed "a joke" in
its practical effects. See VILLRfi, L'AFFAIRE DE LA SECTION SPECIALE 270 (1973). For the
West German system, see Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney
in West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 511 (1970). On the Russian prosecutor, see H.
BERMAN, SOVmT CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 109-17 (1966). Relatively speaking, Dutch
prosecutors have a degree of local independence. See Rosett, Trial and Discretion in
Dutch Criminal Justice, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 353, 364-65 (1972).
8. On the limits of this subordination see Jescheck, supra note 7, at 511. See generally
Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. Comi,. L. 483,
487-89 (1970).
9. This is, for example, the case in West Germany, where the police and prosecutorial
offices are organized on the state, not federal, level. But a striving for uniformity is
nevertheless obvious. See Richtlinien filr das Strafverfahren, in STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (T.
Kleinknecht ed. 30th ed. 1972). In this connection it must also be noted that, for the
sake of uniformity, both substantive and procedural criminal law tends to be heavily
"federalized" in all continental federations. The Soviet Union is only an apparent ex-
ception, because the constituent republics are bound by federal model legislation in both
procedure and substance. Swiss cantons in the field of procedure, and the Yugoslav con-
stituent republics in substantive law, can more properly be viewed as minor deviations
from the prevailing continental pattern of "treating" criminal law essentially as a federal
matter.
10. In federally structured continental countries there are no parallel hierarchies of
federal and state courts. The only federal court is the supreme court, placed at the apex
of the national hierarchy of regular courts. In case of a conflict between state supreme
courts and the federal supreme court, various mechanisms exist for bringing the issue to
the latter for resolution. For an example in West Germany, see E. KERN, STRAFVERFAHRENS-
RECHT 32 (8th ed. 1967).
Outside the area of our interest, i.e., courts of general jurisdiction which consider
criminal cases, the prevailing continental pattern displays a multiplicity of independent
judicial hierarchies. Rather than a unified court system for the whole country with a
single supreme court, there will be special commercial and administrative courts, perhaps
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ons to cope with centrifugal tendencies in administering criminal
justice. One is the comprehensive and widely used system of appeals;
the other, the comparatively weak forms of lay participation in ad-
judication.
The comprehensive system of appellate review has a long record
on the Continent. Those wishing to trace its history must venture deep
into the hidden origins of the modem state, when continental rulers
began to build bureaucracies to establish their control over previously
independent provincial and local authorities."' As befits a system in
even a special constitutional court. The historical reason for this deviation from the
ideal of rigid centralization originate in attitudes very close to what I have described, in
the administration of criminal justice, as the attitudinal keynote of the hierarchical model.
Yet it would be a serious mistake to believe that this multiplicity of hierarchies, with the
unavoidable conflicts arising therefrom, seriously affects the unity of the legal system in
continental countries; everywhere mechanisms have been developed to settle inter-
hierarchy conflicts. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 350 (3d ed. 1970).
11. The origin of the appellate system in Western civilization is usually traced back
to the post-classical Roman idea that judges exercise their authority by delegation from
the emperor. See T. MOMMSEN, R6NUSCHES STRAFRECHT 980 (1899). Appellate review was,
however, alien to early medieval society; it is fair to say that appeal was "reinvented"
after 1100 A.D. when institutions of the modern state began slowly to emerge.
This movement began in connection with the centralization within the Roman Catholic
church, as a network of ecclessiastical courts developed with the Pope as judex ordinarius
omnium. Soon afterward, accompanying royal centralization, the appellate process be-
came firmly entrenched in the French legal system. Under the famous Criminal Ordinance
of Louis XIV (1670), and probably even before, an appeal was automatic in many criminal
cases. See A. ESMEIN, HISTOIRE DE LA PROCfDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE 177-283 (1882).
Italian medieval lawyers who struck the foundation of continental jus commune main-
tained that an appeal must be permitted both from interlocutory decisions (e.g., a
decision to extract a confession by torture) and from final determination of the trial
court. Many authorities claimed that custom or statutes could not abolish appeals in
criminal matters. See, e.g., 2 CONSILIA ET SINGULARIA OMNIA DONINI HIPPOLYTI DE MARSI-
LIS, CONSILIUM 84, at 11 (1537) [hereinafter cited as DE MARSILnS]. The judge who refused
to transmit an appeal to the superior court was liable to punishment. See the opinion of
Angelus Aretinus de Gambilionibus, in 2 Salvioli, Storia della Procedura Civile e
Criminale in 3 STORMA DEL DIRITFO ITALIANO (P. del Giudice ed. 1927).
Nor was the defendant the only one permitted to appeal; various representatives of
fiscal interest were entitled to appeal from acquittals. See Salvioli, supra. However, Italian
practice in inquisitorial proceedings imposed serious limitations on the defendant's right
to appeal, and in some city-states appeals virtually fell into desuetude. Later theory
hedged the right to appeal in criminal matters with numerous exceptions, some of which
had been advocated even earlier. See 1 DE MARSILUS, CONSILIUM I, at 1, for crimina lese
maiestatis. Among the reasons advanced by scholars for these developments were the
sufficient guarantees against error supplied and the nefarious maxim propter enormitatem
delicti licitum est Jura transgredi (laws may be disregarded because of the magnitude of
crime). See 1 DE MARsIMIs, CoNsILIUM 5, at 9. These Italian ideas were picked up by the
17th century German authority, Benedict Carpzov, and through his influence adopted in
the continental inquisitorial proceedings of many countries. See B. CARPZOV, PRAcTrCA NOVA
RERUM CRIMINALIUM IMPERIALIS SAXONICA, Pars 3, Questio 139, no. 14 (1739). This does not
mean, however, that in German countries there was no review of judicial decisions in
criminal matters. Some interlocutory decisions remained appealable (e.g., the decision to
torture the defendant). Also the investigator's file would be transmitted to a panel of "legal
experts" for decision, and the decision of the latter-at least in capital cases-reconsidered
by a competent ministry.
Carpzov's ideas did not remain unchallenged by his contemporaries. See R. STINTZING,
GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 101 (1884). At any rate, appellate review,
already quite refined in civil matters, was again widely permitted in criminal cases in
the early 19th century. See Fiorelli, Appello (Diritto Intermedio), in 2 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL
Dntarro 714 (1958).
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which decisions of subordinates are supervised by those closer to the
center of power, appellate review was from its inception conceived
as a comprehensive device that permitted, at least at the first level
of review, a complete reconsideration of the case. Thus criminal ap-
peal in all modern continental systems implies a review not only of
alleged legal error, but also of factual findings and even the punish-
ment imposed.' 2 Nor is it surprising, in light of centuries of tradi-
tion, that appellate review gradually became associated with fairness
in the administration of justice. Indeed, in modern continental coun-
tries, the "right of appeal" is usually elevated to the constitutional
level. The appellate process is made very inexpensive, and is not
risky for the parties.' 3 In large classes of criminal cases even supreme
courts can be reached as a matter of right through the mechanism of
appeals. Of course, one consequence of this is that supreme courts
lose control over their dockets and must handle a large volume of
business. Relatively large numbers of judges must be appointed to
the top of the judicial hierarchy and divided into panels, some of
which specialize in the adjudication of criminal cases. 14 But the un-
certainty produced while waiting for the Supreme Court to consent
to decide a controversial question is almost totally absent from the
continental scene, and the continental appellate mechanism is able
to achieve considerable uniformity of decisionmaking on most of the
important issues arising in the administration of criminal justice.
The ready availability of appellate review has bequeathed many
legacies to all continental procedures. One of these must be pur-
sued in some detail, because, as I shall later show, it explains so many
12. For simplicity's sake I apply the term "appeal" to all ordinary legal remedies. See
note 15 infra. In some, but not all, continental systems, after the intermediate appellate
court has spoken, further appeal is permitted only on matters of law. Sentencing problems
may raise issues of "illegality" and "inappropriateness." See Mueller & LePoole, Appellate
Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences: A comparative Study, 21 VAND. L. REv'. 411, 418
(1968).
13. The elimination of risk is connected with the generally accepted principle prohibit-
ing refomatio in peius, i.e., preventing the appellate court from using the defendant's
appeal as an opportunity to modify the judgment of the court below to the detriment of
the appellant. In most continental jurisdictions, the ban applies to proceedings on retrial
as well; but the limits of the prohibition in this situation differ from country to country
and are uncertain and controversial.
14. For instance the criminal law division (La Chambre criminelle) of the French
Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) consists of one president, seventeen judges, and, of
late, four judicial assistants (conseillers redfrendaires). Inconsistencies among supreme
court panels can and do arise. But various mandatory devices have been developed in all
jurisdictions to assure the unity of decisionmaking. For instance, a panel is not author-
ized simply to deviate from a prior decision of another panel, and must submit the issue to
a larger body within the supreme court for resolution. Although the continental legal folk-
lore maintains that judges are not formally bound by prior decisions-in the interest of
uniformity of decisionmaking-this supposed rule does not apply to judges at the supreme
court level. Paradoxically, they seem to have less potential freedom of action than lower
judges.
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puzzling technical contrasts between Anglo-American and continental
procedural arrangements.
Where judicial decisions are normally subject to reconsideration,
it is quite natural to postpone their finality and execution until the
ordinary means of review have been exhausted. 15 In this situation,
however, the appellate process becomes a continuation of trial ad-
judication. Consider the immediate impact of this development on
notions of double jeopardy:"6 If an appeal is part and parcel of one
single proceeding, jeopardy must be regarded as continuing until the
termination of the entire criminal case. Thus, an appeal by the
prosecution from an acquittal would not violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy. Similarly, because convictions are also not
final, it is unnecessary to explain the permissibility of a defendant's
appeal by constructs such as waiver of jeopardy or other fictions.
Moreover, the defendant need not seek a stay of execution; the ex-
ecution of judgments is automatically postponed, at least until the
time limit for the filing of an appeal has expired.
But here I have, perhaps, already gone too far into technical de-
tail. Let me, therefore, quickly turn to the other centripetal weapon
at the disposal of the continental judicial system.
A pure hierarchical model regards with great misgivings any par-
ticipation of lay people in the administration of justice. The reasons
for this attitude are not difficult to see: Laymen are usually unable and
often unwilling to look at criminal cases through the prism of gen-
eral rules. To laymen each case is a crisis, a unique human drama,
rather than a representative of a general class. Thus, no matter what
form it takes, lay participation always injects an element of unpre-
dictability into the criminal justice system.
There are, however, important differences in the degree to which
lay participation in adjudication conflicts with the hierarchical model.
At one pole, and fundamentally antagonistic to the model, is the
Anglo-American jury trial. Decentralized administration is inevitable
where lay people are expected to apply local standards in determining
guilt, and are even permitted to set aside the centrally imposed crim-
inal law embodied in the judge's instructions. Furthermore, the
largely inscrutable and often unchallengeable general verdict rep-
15. Medieval continental law had already elaborated a distinction between ordinary
legal remedies which suspend the res judicata effect of decisions and extraordinary legal
remedies to be used in exceptional situations after the judgment had become legally
binding and executable. It is often mistakenly assumed that this distinction corresponds
to that of direct and collateral attack in American law.
16. The continental counterpart to the prohibition against double jeopardy is the
ne bis in idem maxim.
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resents a crowning example of autonomous rather than delegated ad-
judicative powers.
At the other extreme, from the later Middle Ages to the French
Revolution, the administration of justice on the Continent was
dominated by professional adjudicators. Revolutionary times inau-
gurated a change. It was a period permeated by a somewhat naive
intoxication with the exotic but never fully understood charm of
English political institutions. It was also an epoch of great distrust
of the politically reactionary judicial bureaucracy. The two circum-
stances in combination explain the curious phenomenon that, in
the wake of the victorious French Revolution, the jury trial was
transferred to the Continent, although the English ways of organizing
society were quite alien to French revolutionary ideology.Y It is
important to note, however, that the broad jury discretion was not
imported; from the very beginning, professional officials retained more
control over the jury than was the case in England.' More impor-
tantly the transplanted jury, even in this adulterated form, never really
became acculturated on the Continent. Without recounting here the
exquisite misadventures of the continental jury,' 9 suffice it to note
that the jury soon suffered a decline in all European countries. Never-
theless, though somewhat distorted in the transforming screen of all
ideological migrations, the idea of lay participation in the adjudica-
tion of criminal cases remained a potent political force. Because the
judicial bureaucracy was never powerful enough to secure a complete
reversion to professional adjudication in criminal matters, the natural
result, a sort of compromise, was the adoption of a milder form of
lay participation. The prevailing form came to be a mixed bench on
17. Consider only the extent to which the English jury as an autonomous decision-
maker actually conflicts with the revolutionary ideal of a judge who mechanically applies
preexisting legislative norms. This is, of course, Montesquieu's idea of the adjudicator as
la bouche de la loi.
18. The general verdict was rejected in favor of a form of special verdict, and the
unanimity of jurors was never required. Although briefly, during Year V, the jury verdict
was supposed to be unanimous, if unanimity could not be achieved within 24 hours, a
simple majority would suffice. There was also a limited possibility of changing the jury
verdict by adding new jurors if, in the unanimous opinion of professional judges, the
existing jurors committed a mistake. Probably the best account of the original revolt-
tionary jury is still A. ESMEIN, supra note 11, at 417-30. In addition, from the beginning
the possibility existed of proceedings in absentia. Jury trials could not be "waived" by
the defendant; even if he "pleaded guilty," the case would still have to go to the jury.
The significance of these two deviations from the English model will be discussed later
in connection with the ideological basis of the Anglo-American system.
19. For an excellent account, see Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental
Criminal Law, 53 LAW Q. REv. 99, 388 (1937). Even the French have since abolished the
jury as an independent decisionmaker. The 1941 reforms of the Vichy government, never
repealed on this point by postwar legislation, created a system in which the jurors delib-
erate and vote jointly with professional judges. Somewhat special is the history of the
Tsarist Russian jury introduced in 1864 and abolished by the Soviet government. See S.
KUcHERov, COURTS, LAWYERS AND TRIALS UNDER THE LAST THREE TSARS 51-86 (1953).
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which professional and lay judges sat and decided jointly, and this
is still the representative continental adjudicative body in criminal
matters.2 0
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the actual significance
of lay assessors reduces everywhere to a mere nonfunctional political
embellishment of the decisional body. But few would deny that the
professional judge on the mixed bench is such a towering figure
that the lay influence is rather negligible, 21 and nowhere does this
influence seriously impede uniformity and predictability of decision-
making. Moreover, an appeal lies from the mixed bench to higher
courts which review the entire record, and these courts are typically
composed solely of professional judges.
While it appears that all continental systems have evolved potent
mechanisms to counteract centrifugal tendencies in the administration
of criminal justice, a balanced appraisal must recognize departures
from the ideal of strict judicial centralization. Some of these depar-
tures are simply the minimal requirements of judicial independence
in all modem legal systems. But one centrifugal feature of a different
sort is significant for comparative purposes.
In a centralized judicial system which sets great store by consistency
of decisionmaking, one would expect to find a policy that requires
judges to abide by normative standards expressed by their superiors.
Strangely enough, no such policy is espoused by continental systems,
at least as a matter of formal legal doctrine. Is this phenomenon, in
its actual impact, a serious departure from the ideal of judicial cen-
tralization? Not quite. But to understand the development of this
phenomenon one must first turn to the seemingly inapposite con-
tinental doctrine against judicial lawmaking.
One obvious source of this doctrine is the ideology which inspired
the French Revolution; like most revolutionary thought, it was not
20. There are, of course, many varieties in the composition of the mixed tribunal. By
way of exception, adjudication by professional judges existed solely in prewar Yugoslavia
and still persists only in Holland.
21. This rather general impression has recently been substantiated by empirical re-
search. See, e.g., Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL
SrTUms 135, 186 (1972); Zawadzky Kubicki, L'eldinent populaire et le juge professionel
dans la procddure pdnale en Pologne, 50 REVUE DE DROIT PiNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 919,
929 (1970).
A recent Soviet study revealed that disagreements between the professional judge and
lay-assessors in trial courts arise in only 18 percent of cases surveyed. Of these, only one
percent involved disagreement over the guilt of the defendant. The overwhelming majority
of disagreements concerned the magnitude of punishment. Indeed, sentencing is regarded
by many lay-assessors as the main purpose of the criminal trial. See Raditnaya, 0
metodike issledovanya effektiwaosti uchastiya narodnih zasedatelei v osushcestvenii pravo-
sudia, in EFFEKTIVNOST PRINMENENIYA UGOLOVNOGO ZAKONA 195-97 (N. Kuznetsova & I.
Mikhaylovskaya eds. 1973).
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without a utopian element. It was predicated on the assumption
that normative standards could be developed with such clarity and
over so broad a range of issues that their application to individual
cases would require no creative activity on the part of the judge.
This restrictive role was regarded as a postulate of national legal
unity and as a means of furthering legal certainty. These two values
called for judicial centralization, which, after a brief interlude, be-
came one of the important achievements of the Revolution.
22
Since the proper business of the judiciary was to be solely the
application of norms, rather than their formulation, judicial centrali-
zation was conceived exclusively as centralization of application. Not
even the highest court could authoritatively decide the meaning of legal
propositions. 23 Even on appeal, traditionally so important, review was
to involve only the propriety of the process of norm application,
imagined syllogistically. True, the higher court could disagree with
the court below on the meaning of the normative standard for de-
22. Pre-revolutionary French courts (Parlements) were a centrifugal force, opposed to
the unification of the law. Parlements had the authority to render decisions, not neces-
sarily in the context of an actual litigation, enunciating legal views to be applied in
future cases (arrets de rtglement). In the 18th century, conflicts between these courts and
the monarchy were quite frequent, occasionally creating scandals.
Le r~gne de Louis XV, jusqu'en 1770, fut fertils en conflits entre [Parlements] et le
pouvoir royale, .... et les deux partis allaient jusqu'a l'4xtreme usage de leurs droits
traditionels.
A. ESMEIN, COURS kLEMiNTAIRE D'HISTOIRE Du DROIT FRANCAIS 520 (1921); J. SHENNAN,
THE PARLEMENT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS 285 (1968). In
addition, conflicts among the 14 Parlements on many legal issues often occurred during
the Ancien Regime. In contrast to common law judges, the French judiciary was not so
definitely on the side of the middle class, in many respects judges were quite reactionary,
and French revolutionary ideology was strongly antijudicial. This ideology reached coun-
tries with quite different judicial traditions. See note 26 infra.
23. Analytically this determination can take place in three situations. The first is one
in which the supreme court determines general rules independently of actual litigation.
This is pure judicial legislation. Another is by a determination for the case sub judice,
i.e., by a legal opinion expressed in remanding to the court below. Finally, legal opinions
expressed by the supreme court in actual litigation may be considered binding in
another similar case. The original revolutionary ideology prohibited supreme courts troin
making binding determination in all of these situations. M. CAPPELLETI, J. MERRYMAN &
J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 150 (1967).
The very process of judicial interpretation, be it authoritative or not, was viewed with
suspicion in the revolutionary eras. Thus, more than a century before the French revolu-
tion, English Levellers advocated a simple codification of law, coupled with a ban on
judicial interpretation. See Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century
England, 1974 Wis. L. R~v. 428, 449-50, 455. Two French revolutionary decrees of 1790
forbade courts any interpretation of laws. See F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE
AUTHORITARIAN STATE 38, 141 (1957).
Less known is the fact that this radical ideology of the rising bourgeoisie was shared by
continental "enlightened monarchs" in their efforts to codify the law. For instance, on
April 14, 1780, a decade before the aforementioned French revolutionary decrees,
Frederich II of Prussia prohibited judicial interpretation of laws. Similarly, in 1786,
Emperor Joseph II of Austria prohibited interpretation of his Code. An instruction was
passed in Bavaria in 1813 forbidding the writing of commentaries to the famous Bavarian
Penal Code of the same year. See id. This alliance of monarchical and bourgeois interests
in shaping the law on the Continent is a major theme in Max Weber's work. See MAX
WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 267, 279, 289 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
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cision, but it could not require adherence to its views even in re-
manding a case for retrial. 24 Given the internal logic of the doctrine
this is not a strange arrangement. If the creation of law is ultra vires
for the judiciary, there cannot be any super- or sub-ordination on
this issue. All judges are equally subordinated to the legislator. The
strength of their legal pronouncement derives solely from supporting
arguments. Tantum valet quantum ratio probat. -5
As revolutionary ideology confronted the constraints of the pos-
sible, the pristine views on the role of the judge were qualified some-
what. Nevertheless, the basic contours of the doctrine remain intact
to the present day and its continuing vitality can be seen as an ideal
to be approximated. 20 Those inroads that have been made are in
the narrow area of binding lower courts to legal views expressed by
superiors on the remand of a case for reconsideration.
27
So much then for continental legal folklore. More relevant to my
purposes is the actual importance of normative standards expressed
by superior courts for the decisionmaking of courts below.
Although technically not binding, these normative standards are
of extreme importance in the actual operation of criminal justice.
28
Because the striving for uniformity and consistent decisionmaking
24. See note 27 infra.
25. "It is worth as much as can be proven by reason."
26. This attitude toward judicial legislation can no longer be attributed either to the
traumatic experience with French judges during the Ancien Rdgime or to the relatively
rigid continental views on separation of powers. A deeper explanation focuses on the
continental belief that judicial lawmaking (unless guided by scholarly conceptual frame-
works or legislative directives) results in casuistry, ultimately subverting legal certainty.
This belief probably dates back to the rise of medieval universities; praxis caecus in via
is an adage much older than Montesquieu. But this problem is a faded fresco I cannot
even begin to restore here. For a modern reconstruction of this doctrine, see the decision
of the West German Constitutional Court cited infra note 69.
27. In some continental countries the legal rule determined by the supreme court is
binding on first remand. In the majority of jurisdictions, however, the old doctrine is
partially maintained, and the first court of remand retains the option to refuse to apply
the law as enunciated by the supreme court. Only if a larger augmented panel meets
(e.g., a supreme court session) following a second appeal will its legal view be binding on
second remand. At the level of the intermediate appellate courts, the old doctrine
frequently preserves its full force.
It is true that in some systems repeated decisions of supreme courts are legally binding
(juri prudence constante, doctrina legal), but this is usually explained in terms of custom.
Decisions of constitutional courts are also legally binding, but these courts are sui
generis.
Sophisticated continental theorists seem of late to recognize some additional instances
in which court decisions possess legally (not factually) binding power. Most interesting of
these is the case in which a supreme court announces an important legal principle (e.g.,
that mistake of law constitutes a defense, or that debts should be revalued due to cur-
rency collapse), and this principle accords with widely held convictions of justice. See K.
LARENZ, MErTHODENLEHRE DER RECHTswISSENSCHAFr 411 (2d ed. 1969).
28. On this subject the literature is truly vast. For a subtle and insightful presenta-
tion, see R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 434; cf. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 5, at 23, 48.
Unless conformity were expected, such formal opinions would be nonsensical.
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is such an overriding tendency in all continental systems, a number
of mechanisms have been designed to make lower courts accept legal
propositions developed by superior courts.
Such mechanisms may operate outside actual litigation. In many
countries, for example, supreme courts will formally enunciate ad-
visory legal opinions; although usually not binding, these opinions in
actual fact will be followed.29 Less visible, never published, but per-
haps more important are various internal recommendations and cir-
culars on legal issues flowing from higher to lower courts on diverse
occasions, such as following the inspection of lower courts or perusal
of their files.
Closer to the enunciation of normative propositions in actual liti-
gation, and appearing quite bizarre to outsiders, are the "audit" pro-
cedures by which supreme courts review final decisions "in the in-
terest of the law."' 0 Frequently their effect is solely to declare that
in a decision "law was misinterpreted," but without changing the
adjudication. The effet platonique of such supreme court decisions
remains entirely incomprehensible unless their purpose is revealed as
one of assuring uniformity of decisionmaking in lower courts. Finally,
the pervasive appellate mechanism renders legal opinions of higher
courts quite important. If the lower court judge fails to follow the
legal views of his superiors, his decision inevitably will either be
reversed or amended. All continental systems, mirroring the hier-
archical model, have developed effective pressures against the display
of obstinacy and independent assertion of views by the lower ju-
diciary. Briefly, when the continental judge knows of a legal view
expressed by his superiors and has reason to believe they still adhere
to it, he will usually follow it even without any doctrinal obligation
29. Occasionally such opinions are even declared legally binding. An interesting ex-
ample was the system adopted by the Tsarist Russian supreme court (Ruling Senate). Its
rulings, if rendered by "super-panels" (an enlarged complement of judges), were binding
on similar cases in the future. See N. ROZ[N, UcOLOVNOE SUDOI'ROIZVODSTVO 85 (1916). Of
course, Russian legal scholars of the time, steeped in the continental legal tradition, tried
desperately to reconcile this judicial legislation with the prevailing legal folklore. In a
modern reflection of the old system, Soviet supreme courts can presently also issue bind-
ing directives to courts below (so-called postanovlenia), and their example is followed in
some Eastern European systems. But, in keeping with the orthodox continental theory of
legal sources, this actual norm-creating activity is classified as one pertaining solely to
the "application" of law, a supposedly automatic operation devoid of judicial creativity.
See I M. STROcovicH, KuPs SovErsKoco UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA 73-74 (1968). Soviet legal
theory is generally hostile to judicial legislation, which it associates with law in monopolist
capitalism. See V. TUMANOV, BURZHUAZNAIA PRAVOVAIA IDEOLOCIIA 74 (1971).
30. A prototype of such a mechanism is the French "pourvoi en cassation dans 'in.
tdrt de la loi." See G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, supra note 7, at 757-59. Similar devices
exist in Austria (arts. 33 and 282, Code of Penal Procedure), and in most Eastern Euro-
pean countries. See Rudzinski, Soviet-Type Audit Proceedings and their Western Counter-
parts, in L. BOIM, G. MORGAN & A. RuDzINSKi, LEGAL CONTROLS IN THE SoVIr UNION 287
(1966).
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to do so. Whether this view happens to be expressed within or without
the context of a particular case will be largely irrelevant to him. In-
stances in which trial judges actually use the freedom to develop legal
standards accorded them by the system's folklore constitute quite rare
deviations from the mode.
This does not mean, however, that continental systems have adopted
in practice, although not in theory, the doctrine of stare decisis. 31 As
already shown, prior decisions rendered in actual litigation have
serious competitors as sources of information on legal views of higher
courts. 32 But even if the first reaction of continental judges were
always to reach for prior decisions, an important difference would
still remain between their style and that expressed by the doctrine of
stare decisis. To a continental judge a prior decision is not a "case,"
a solution to a real life problem in all the richness of its raw facts. What
he is looking for in a decision is essentially a specification of a more
general legal proposition that will cover the case before him. The
facts of the decided case will seldom interest him; indeed, they may
often constitute a regrettable distraction from his proper business of
finding a precisely articulated standard.33 Most of the time, an ab-
stract legal proposition, totally denuded of the enveloping factual con-
text, will suffice for his purposes. Gone is the flexibility springing
from the "distinguishing" of cases on their facts, or emanating from
broader and narrower formulation of holdings. Gone also is the free-
dom resulting from the various degrees of weight that can be attri-
31. It is sometimes said that, at the time of the French Revolution, continental
countries rejected stare decisis, while importing many other English judicial institutions.
In fact, they were only reacting to their own pre-revolutionary experience. The doctrine of
stare decisis is a product of the 19th century, and did not even exist in England at the
time when French political theorists looked to that country for inspiration. The neces-
sary cohesion of the English common law was maintained at the time by the oral trans-
mission of tradition within a small group of lawyers and judges. The stare decisis doc-
trine appeared only after the expansion of the judicial system broke down the cohesion
of the common law. See A. SIMPSON, THE COMMON LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, in OxFoRD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77, 98 (1973). Assume, however, that French
revolutionists were familiar with an analogue of stare decisis, conceived as an instrument
designed to assure consistency in a system where law gradually evolves from judicial
decisionmaking; even so, they would have rejected such doctrine without hesitancy be-
cause it clashes irreconcilably with the view that legal standards must be formulated by
the legislator rather than the judiciary.
A related but unexplored contemporary question concerns the effect of an accelerated
pace of change on the doctrine of stare decisis, the essence of which is tradition.
32. An important additional source of information are commentaries written by
scholars whose primary function is to maintain order in the normative universe.
33. Therefore, continental decisions will contain only the thinnest distillate of legally
relevant facts. Building upon an idea expressed by T.S. Kuhn, one would say that con-
tinentals do not treat prior cases as examples shared by the profession, examples that are
applied without mediation of rules. Rather from the examples (actual decided cases) they
abstract rules which are to function instead of shared examples. The two processes are
altogether different manners of knowing. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TION 192 (2d ed. 1970).
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buted to precedents. The rule found in the decision either applies
or it does not.34 This difference is of great importance, because fol-
lowing prior decisions in the continental fashion leads to much more
rigidity than is the case under the stare decisis doctrine. While the
latter does not prevent the growth of law, the former easily can.35
Here I must return from my excursion into deviations by the con-
tinental judicial organization from the ideal of strict centralization.
These deviations do not prevent the machinery of justice from main-
taining a high degree of uniformity in decisionmaking, and strong
pressure toward centralization remains one of the most distinguishing
characteristics of all continental agencies operating in the admin-
istration of criminal justice.
2. Rigid Ordering of Authority
Preceding by several centuries the unification of law, stratified ad-
ministrative structures appeared on the Continent as early as the 13th
century.3 6 In discussing the elaborate appellate system that resulted
from this development, I have already touched on some hierarchical
aspects. What remains for consideration are three characteristics of
a rigorous hierarchical design suggested by the hierarchical model. As
the highly defined stratification of continental police and public
prosecution is too plain for argument, I shall focus solely on the
organization of the judiciary.
The first characteristic is the precise delineation of responsibilities,
both internally and in relation to other branches of government.
In this regard, the continental judiciary clearly satisfies the require-
ments of a rigid ordering of authority. To begin with, consider that
continental courts have no "inherent powers," and it is these powers
that invest any structure with marginal ambiguity. Whatever au-
thority is vested in continental courts derives from legislation. And
in their desire to anticipate the future through legislation, contin-
entals have settled jurisdictional issues relatively well. Waiting for
a crisis to bring up basic problems before deciding them appears to
be a style that produces too much anxiety for continentals. Further-
more, it is important to note that allocation of adjudicative authority
34. See H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 100, 113 (1968).
35. Ehrenzweig is probably right in claiming that the adoption of stare decisis in its
continental variant would invest the continental legal system with great rigidity. See A.
EHRENZWEIC, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 132-33 (1971). The continental view of the
legal decision explains why continental lawyers have great difficulty grasping that a legal
system can grow and change by standing on precedents. They simply project their own
perceptions of decisions into the common law world.
36. See J. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 50-52 (1970).
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on the Continent invariably implies both the power and the duty
to act, so that continental courts lack the option to refuse considera-
tion of a case.
37
Descending to details, a few examples of precise delineation of au-
thority must be offered. A provision allocating the same matter either
to a single judge or a panel, or authorizing both the trial and the
appellate judge to render or alter the same decision, would be viewed
in the continental systems as a serious ambiguity to be quickly rem-
edied. Similarly, it would be unacceptable for a judge to be able
to change his decision after he has announced it, even if such power
extended only for a limited time period; once the decision is an-
nounced the court loses all power over it, and only the hierarchical
superior can alter it. Relatively little difficulty is ever encountered
in determining the proper adjudicator and relationships of super-
and sub-ordination. 38
A second characteristic of rigorous hierarchies is the pronounced
differentiation among judges at various levels, and in this the con-
tinental judiciary corresponds quite closely to the model. Let me
begin with the courts of original jurisdiction.39 A single judge will
be authorized to decide only minor offenses. 40 More serious cases are
allocated to a panel. If, however, serious felonies or sensitive matters
such as political issues are involved, the criminal case will usually
fall within the province of a higher trial court. More significantly
for my purposes, many sensitive decisions that in other systems are
made at the level of original adjudication are either taken away from
the trial courts altogether and vested in appellate courts or removed
from the judiciary entirely. For example, the idea that a trial judge
could be entitled to determine whether a high government official
is properly exercising his testimonial privilege, or what is and what
is not in the interests of national security, appears almost preposterous
from the continental perspective.41 From such a perspective, if these
37. The forum non conveniens doctrine is largely unknown, as are mechanisms such
as certiorari.
38. A further problem pertaining to certitude about adjudicative powers concerns
judicial disqualification, which makes clear the contrasts between an autonomous and a
bureaucratic decisionmaker. From a comparative law perspective, judicial disqualification
in common law countries would have to be related to voir dire. See notes 96, 117 infra.
39. I am talking of ordinary courts of record. Punishable conduct of noncriminal
nature (i.e., "administrative offenses") is considered by officials other than judges.
40. The practice in Holland is contrary.
41. The West German Criminal Procedure Code accords the right to the head of
state to refuse to give testimony in criminal cases if he believes this to be in the national
interest. GERMAN CoDnE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 54(3), at 44 (Am. Series of Foreign
Penal Codes, No. 10, 1965). No court is entitled to probe whether he justifiably invokes
the national interest. But, if the head of state chooses to testify, even the manner in
which his testimony is taken is regulated. Id. § 49, at 41.
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problems are to be entrusted to the judiciary at all, it would seem
natural to vest authority to resolve them in a judicial echelon cor-
responding to the rank of the government official whose acts are in
question. Any other solution would be regarded as a serious dis-
ruption of elementary symmetry in the allocation of authority. Con-
sider also the power to review the constitutionality of legislation. It
is probably still fair to say that continentals regard the ordinary
judiciary to be an inappropriate authority to strike down statutes
as unconstitutional. If judicial review is allowed, it is entrusted to
a special high tribunal which deviates in many ways from "normal"
courts. It would be truly alien to this system to decentralize judicial
review by authorizing ordinary trial judges to declare legislation un-
constitutional. 42 Such an arrangement would introduce a serious hier-
archical disharmony.43
Let us move up the hierarchy to appellate courts. Here, one quite
frequently encounters significant hierarchical differentiation. Judges
normally decide cases in small panels; some important matters, how-
ever, come within the province of super-panels whose legal views are
binding on ordinary panels. In this manner internal or infra-court
echelons of authority are created. As shown before, this is especially
important at the supreme court level. 44 Nor is it unusual that a rudi-
mentary hierarchy may appear even in a single panel, in the sense
that rules evolve which accord certain powers to the president and
other powers to the full panel. This should come as no surprise. To
a considerable extent, this ranking accompanies the elaborate and ex-
tensive reviewability of decisions; later, when recruitment and pro-
motion techniques are considered, it will become even more significant.
42. On judicial review in Europe see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CON-
TEMPORARY WORLD 54-66 (1971). The abhorrence of a diffuse power to review the con-
stitutionality of statutes can be explained otherwise than by the low esteem in which
trial judges are held. But surely it would appear incongruous to continentals to let a
low bureaucrat, often a young novice, review the legislative determination. Where this
is permitted at all (as in West Germany or Yugoslavia), the trial judge can only find the
statute constitutional. If he suspects its possible unconstitutionality, he must suspend the
proceedings and refer the issue to the constitutional court.
43. For further examples of decisions removed from lower to higher courts because
of the importance of the issue involved, consider provisions such as §§ 121, 122 of the
West German Criminal Procedural Code, authorizing only higher courts to extend pre-
liminary detention beyond a certain time limit. GERMAN CODE OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 41, at 71-72.
44. See note 27 supra. An extreme case of such differentiation, leading to the pos-
sibility of internal review, is the arrangement found in the supreme courts of the Soviet
Union. See H. BERMAN, supra note 7, at 92. Higher courts in the Soviet Union can take
cases away from lower courts and decide them themselves, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OF THE RSFSR art. 40 (1972), although this power is apparently seldom exercised. In most
continental systems, however, such powers of higher courts would be an unacceptable,
sometimes even unconstitutional, deprivation of the citizen's right to have "the judge
determined by statute." Not even the intermediate appellate level can be skipped.
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The last demand of a rigid ordering of authority is that courts be
treated as units, distinct and separate from their judges. This pre-
cisely correlates with the hierarchical model.
Consider first the situation in which a matter falls within the
province of a single judge. Even after a particular judge has been
assigned to decide the matter, all motions and briefs must be directed
to the court on which the judge sits, rather than to him personally.
And when he has rendered his decision, he has spoken for the whole
court. Thus, the same matter cannot be considered again by another
member of the same bench thereby creating complexities and dupli-
cations. For example, a party denied bail cannot turn to another
judge in the hope of obtaining it. Most of the time, however, criminal
matters will be in the province of a panel whose behavior is rooted
in the long continental tradition of collective decisionmaking. 45 Not
surprisingly, the panel is elevated into an abstract, faceless legal crea-
ture, a sort of corporate personality. It is thus not unusual to find
continental systems in which opinions are not even signed by the
individual judges who wrote them. Judicial dissents are neither orally
announced nor published. While many reasons are advanced in sup-
port of this arrangement, there is only one which in my view goes
beyond the surface of the continental system: 46 Where a hierarchical
organization created for the sake of assuring unity and certainty is
not forced to be unisonous, especially at the top of the pyramid, the
animating presuppositions of the whole structure are strained, and
the criteria for decisionmaking become either completely elusive or
affected with a germ of dissolution.47
45. The old French maxim juge unique-juge inique expresses the fear of entrusting
the power to decide cases to a single person. I cannot consider here the extent to which
this attitude is connected with the reluctance of continental monarchs to delegate sub-
stantial authority to a single individual.
46. Reasons frequently mentioned are the desire to prevent outside interference with
the adjudicative process and to enhance public confidence in the administration of
justice. See, e.g., R. SCHLESINC.ER, supra note 10, at 157. Even in a rare continental jurisdic-
tion such as Norway which permits the announcement of dissenting opinions, dissents are
quite rare, especially on points of law. See Andenaes, Reasons for differences of opinion
on questions of law, in 15 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 29 (1971).
47. The fact that constitutional courts in a few continental systems have recently
begun to permit publication of dissents perhaps only strengthens the point made in the
text. Constitutional courts are viewed as "political" tribunals, deviating from the "pure"
model of courts. Although judges may be permitted to disagree on political questions,
even at inordinate length if they so desire, in legal matters there must be "true law,"
necessarily unisonous rather than contrapuntal. For further insight into the "institution-
alization" of agencies participating in the administration of justice and the underlying
desire for unity and order, consider the "monocratic" organization (Fiihrerprinzip) of
prosecutorial offices. See, e.g., M. VELLANI, IL PUBLO MIN1STRO NEL PROCESSo (1970).
Broader studies would probably also have to encompass differences between the common
law and civil law concepts of corporate personality.
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3. Preference for Determinative Rules
It is common knowledge that officials must have considerable lee-
way in solving many of the problems involved in the administration
of criminal justice. The exercise of official discretion4 s seems at once
more natural and desirable in this area than in many others. It is
therefore all the more remarkable that continental systems insist
even here on guiding officials by precise standards, and are quite
reluctant to be satisfied with vague principles and policies as guide-
lines for conduct. To outside observers, continental attitudes some-
times seem to reveal symptoms of a mind which has lost all touch
with reality, whose aspirations have become utterly quixotic. This
is, then, a question of great importance for comparative studies, and
it must be traced from the police stage, where it is least pronounced,
to the prosecutorial and judicial levels.
a. The Police. A general feature of continental police forces is a
high degree of regimentation and pervasive regulation. This feature
escapes those observers who identify regulation with external nor-
mative constraint on police forces. However, both a strict hierarchy
and a professional tradition favor a great deal of internal regulation;
uniformity, consistency, and internal review by superiors are routine.
In fact, the saturation of police forces with internal regulation bears
a strong resemblance to that of the military. As a result, the police
tend to assess situations with reference to existing internal regulations.
Substantial discretion tends to gravitate to higher echelons of the
police hierarchy; lower levels are guided by rules and subjected to
extensive internal control.
As far as external constraints are concerned, relatively few norma-
tive standards can be located in most continental codes of criminal
procedure. It is startling, considering the importance of police work
in all modem systems, to reflect on the meager regulation of police
inquiries as compared to that of prosecutorial or judicial investiga-
tions. 4 9 Significantly, however, except in the area of minor crime,
most continental countries refuse to concede to the police the au-
thority to decide whether or not to invoke the criminal process. This
is seldom explicit, but rather follows inferentially from a variety of
arrangements. For example, in West Germany and Yugoslavia, official
agencies, including the police, are legally bound to report all criminal
48. See note 6 supra on the use of the term discretion.
49. In some continental countries procedural theorists insist that the police stage
precedes the institution of criminal proceedings, and that therefore the law of criminal
procedure does not apply to the police. But these internally influential opinions must be
rejected on a broader comparative plane.
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activity to the prosecutor's office. Thus, at least as a matter of legal
norm, the police must forward to the prosecutor all information on
criminal conduct.5° While it would be naive to assume that all such
information actually reaches the prosecutor, this legal obligation creates
a moderating influence on temptations to exploit police discretion.
Also contributing to this result is the particular role of the victim in
continental proceedings, to which I shall turn in discussing the con-
tinental public prosecutor.
b. Public Prosecutors. Although there are numerous kinds of deci-
sions on which prosecutors can have more or less freedom from
normative standards, most people would agree that the central issue
is whether the public prosecutor should have broad discretion in in-
stituting criminal proceedings. On this question, at least in cases of
serious crime,5' the practice of continental countries can be classified
into two groups.
The first and larger group espouses the principle that, given the
initial probability that a serious crime has been committed, public
prosecutors must press charges as part of their official duty; this is
the principle of mandatory prosecution (Legalitiitsprinzip; principe de
legalite des poursuites).52 It can hardly be maintained that as a result
of the operation of this principle the public prosecutor has no leeway
in deciding not to prosecute.53 But his freedom in doing so is seriously
50. See Jescheck, supra note 17, at 510; Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure articles
137, 139.
51. As regards minor crime, continental prosecutors have a great deal of leeway. Some-
times this is openly acknowledged as a matter of legal doctrine. For West Germany, see,
e.g., J. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 439
(1974). In a number of countries, however, for various ideological reasons, the prosecutor
is expected as a matter of legal folklore to prosecute fully even minor crime. But it is
not hard to find in all countries numerous alternative devices providing the prosecutor
with the necessary flexibility. One such prosecutorial "cushion" lies in the substantive
provisions spelling out the definitional elements of criminal offenses. Conduct which
satisfies the definition but presents only insignificant "social danger" is denied the char-
acter of a crime. See, e.g., art. 7(2) Criminal Code of RSFSR; art. 4(2) Yugoslav Criminal
Code. Such provisions give prosecutors asylum from the rigidities of legal folklore. Rather
than justifying their failure to prosecute minor crime by reasons of inconvenience or
some other factor, they simply say that there is no crime at all. Thus, rationalizations
change, but the actual effect is the same as under systems where the principle of manda-
tory prosecution does not apply for minor crime. For other alternatives see, e.g., art 7
Criminal Procedural Code of RSFSR. This is not to say, however, that in refusing to
prosecute minor crime, continental prosecutors are not bound by internal prosecutorial
rules.
52. This principle was adopted by the French Revolution as a postulate of equality
and disseminated throughout Europe. There are exceptions to this principle for some
political offenses, juvenile delinquency and-of course-minor offenses. For such excep-
tions in West Germany, see Jescheck, supra note 10, at 513. France has since repudiated
the idea of mandatory prosecution.
53. For a realistic recent appraisal of the situation in West Germany, see G. KAISER,
STRATEGIEN UND PROZESSE STRAFRECHTLICHER SOZIALKONTROLLE 78-86 (1972). An unavoidable
flexibility stems clearly from the appraisal of the initial probability that a crime has
been committed.
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limited, and there are effective pressures on him to abide by this
normative mandate. Within the purview of this essay it is enough
to point to arrangements whereby the victim of crime, in one way or
another, can check the prosecutor's refusal to press charges.54 In ad-
dition, there are less visible but extremely important internal con-
straints on the exercise of prosecutorial freedom; within the hierarchy
of the prosecutor's office there are regulations guiding the decision
of whether to invoke the criminal process. For instance, oral or written
directions instruct the prosecutor as to the significance of first-offender
status in regard to specific offenses, or the point at which property
damage becomes minimal. Accordingly, prosecutors often press charges
contre coeur, or against their personal wishes, led to their decisions
by normative directives.
The second and smaller group of continental countries authorize the
public prosecutor to decline prosecution, even with respect to serious
crime, if such a decision appears to be in the public interest; this is the
principle of expediency (Opportunitdtsprinzip; principe de l'opportu-
nitd des poursuites).c It is tempting to associate this principle with
broad prosecutorial freedom from normative constraints, but to do so
would be a serious mistake. The victim, who partakes in prosecutorial
activity under this system as well, may institute prosecution if the pub-
lic prosecutor fails to do so, and this alternative restrains official dis-
cretion. More importantly, prosecutorial freedom is once again confined
by extensive internal regulation, which reflects the emphasis placed on
consistency and uniformity of decisions. Where rules can be formulated,
instructions and circulars will flow profusely down hierarchically de-
fined channels; where contours of experience prove elusive, frequent
conferences will be convened, in efforts toward the formulation of ever
more articulate guides.56 Once established, these standards will be
enforced throughout the hierarchical pyramid.
c. The Judiciary. It stands to reason that the vaguer the decisional
standard adopted, the more difficult it becomes to reconsider the
resultant decision. A judicial organization cannot be seriously com-
mitted at once to both regular review and broad discretionary powers
without succumbing to a sort of institutional schizophrenia. Obviously,
54. One example is the method by which the victim can secure from the court a
mandamus ordering the prosecutor to press charges (Klageerzwingungsverfahren). Another
is the Austrian invention of a "subsidiary charge" preferred by the victim if the public
prosecutor fails to prosecute. Of course, in victimless crime, external pressures on
prosecutors to institute proceedings are weak.
55. This is, for instance, the present system in France, Belgium, Holland and a limited
number of other European countries.
56. Only a few internal guidelines become visible-those formulated at the very top of
the hierarchy and published.
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then, because it values appellate review so highly, the continental ju-
diciary necessarily favors standards as lucidly defined as possible. In
the absence of the jury as the autonomous decisionmaker par excel-
lence, this is not overly difficult.
Most comparatists would probably agree that continental criminal
legislation, both substantive and procedural, purports to cover all
problems that can be anticipated, including the very exceptional
situation."7 Permissive as opposed to mandatory language is quite
rare. This, of course, furnishes to decisionmakers only the broad
framework of normative standards. But broad legislative standards
are made more concrete by the judicial hierarchy, both within and
without actual litigation, and the normative output of higher courts
is quite rigid. Consistency, mutual compatibility of rules, perhaps
even an order of analysis within the resulting normative universe are
maintained by "legal science."' ' 8
But norm-saturation is not the only relevant consideration; atti-
tudes towards norms are also important. It would be a serious mistake
to think that this attitude is independent of the authority structure.
Comparatively speaking, the attitude of the continental judiciary to-
ward normative standards can easily be classified as rigid and un-
bending. Norms are not regarded, even in procedure and practice
outside the trial context, as instructions from which there are legiti-
mate departures. The great deference of the continental judiciary
toward legislation is one of the loci communes of comparative law,
and this is only partially mirrored in the uneasiness of the ordinary
judiciary concerning the constitutional review of statutes. Equally im-
portant is the meticulous observance of norms emanating from higher
courts. In sum, rules regulating the behavior of the continental ju-
diciary are not only relatively precise and prolific, they are also com-
paratively inflexible.
We can now begin to understand some intellectual habits of con-
tinental judges and the idiom of their debate. Both have struck out-
siders as abstract, and yet capable of easily producing accurate answers.
57. On the substantive side, duress and necessity are good examples. With respect to
procedural problems, see, e.g., note 41 supra. The law of evidence, governed by the
"principle of free evaluation," seems to be an exception. The absence of norms in this
area does not significantly free the continental judge. Factual findings must be justified
in his opinion and are subject to review. Low-visibility rules have developed in all judicial
hierarchies regarding evidentiary questions. On the reasons for the legislative abdication
in evidentiary matters see Damaska, supra note 1, at 514-15.
58. On continental legal science generally, see, e.g., J. MERRYMAN, supra note 5, at
65-72. On the science of criminal law specifically, see Ryu & Silving, Toward a Rational
System of Criminal Law, 32 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 119 (1963).
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Where law is not interwoven with the tradition of deciding cases in
all their intricacy, the knowledge of law is not necessarily a knowledge
of details.
4. Importance of Official Documents and Reports
Implicit in the ubiquitous hierarchical control of the continental
machinery of criminal justice is the importance of documentation.
Traces of all official activity must be preserved for possible review
by superiors. Thus files must be maintained on all official matters,
and these files can be closed only in accordance with precise rules.
All official activity must be recorded and even minor decisions and
their justifications reduced to written form. The part played by paper-
work, ministerial matters, and bureaucratic minutiae in the total ef-
fort of officialdom is quite considerable.
Documents and reports drafted by officials are highly formalized.
Specific matter must be included in specific parts of documents. 9
Exposition must be succinct and summaries made whenever possible.u
Even the style of writing is standardized: It frequently becomes arid,
impersonal, and clich6-ridden. 61 Personal expression, even in a jeweled
and coruscated style, is anathema. Usually, tendencies toward indi-
vidualism are rooted out during one's novitiate in the bureaucracy.
As a consequence, anything but an impersonal stylus curiae would
constitute a display of bad taste and lack of professionalism.
The great importance of this wealth of documentation, most of
which ends up in the file of the criminal case, cannot in candor
be denied. This is lost to many continental theoretical writers, over-
impressed by the reduced role of dossiers in criminal cases after the
abolition of inquisitorial procedure. 2 Concentrating on the trial stage,
they stress that evidence which has not been brought out during trial
59. Sometimes proper inclusion is of great practical significance. For instance, as a
rule, only matter included in the "ordering part" of continental criminal judgments be-
comes res judicata. During their novitiate fledgling officials must learn exactly what
must be included into the ordering part, and how it should read.
60. Thus, for instance, testimony will very seldom be taken verbatim. Instead, short
summaries of what witnesses said filter information through the transforming screen of
legal relevance.
61. There are of course differences of degree among various continental countries
inter sese. For instance, the style of the French Cour de Cassation would be at the formal
pole, while the Swedish judgments fall close to the other extreme. But even the latter are
far removed from the personal, often lengthy expression of common law judges. See
generally J. VETTER, THE STYLES OF APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1960).
62. In inquisitorial proceedings the decision was based solely on the written file. Quod
non est in actis non est in mundo was the maxim of the day. Even in the French revolu-
tionary assembly, enchanted as it was by English viva vox proceedings, reliance on any-
thing but written documents was vigorously opposed as an attempt to "6crire sur de la
neige." Compare A. EsMEIN, supra note 11, at 434.
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may no longer be used in arriving at the decision, due to the "prin-
ciple of immediacy." 63 But when all the usual arguments have been
made, the fact remains that the dossier still constitutes the backbone
of criminal proceedings. Note particularly that in almost all conti-
nental countries the presiding judge studies the file in advance of the
trial, and that many important documents from the file can be read
aloud in court as evidence. 64 Finally, the extent to which a cloistral
calm, unperturbed by viva vox, permeates the appellate process must
be obvious to anyone who comes from a less bureaucratic system.
5. Behavior Expectations
On this last point of comparison between existing continental sys-
tems and the hierarchical model I can be very brief, for much of what
I would have to say has already been mentioned.63 It will be recalled
that the 18th century vision of decisionmaking as an automatic process
of norm application has been recognized as a rationalist illusion and
rejected as a practical proposition; it has remained, however, as a
regulating ideal.66 Often the obscured constituent of complex proc-
esses, this ideal can best be perceived in existing role expectations,
and some of these can, I believe, be factored out as representative
of the continental machinery of criminal law enforcement.
Officials are not supposed to be autonomous decisionmakers, but
are instead expected to adopt the behavioral idiom of civil servants.
Guidance for official activity must be sought in the corpus of of-
ficial norms, so that all problems appear primarily as technical ad-
ministrative questions. Professional craftsmanship is a highly valued
asset.67 When no standards for decisionmaking exist, and independent
63. See Damabka, supra note 1, at 517; H. LS1HR, DER GRUNDSATZ DER UNMITrELBARKEIT
3M DEUTSCHEN STRAFPROZESSRECFlT (1972) (monograph on West German aspects, with com-
parative comments).
64. For details, see Damaika, supra note 1, at 519.
65. See, e.g., pp. 506-07 supra (the rigid discipline enforced in writing decisions); p.
506 supra (the handling of documents and dossiers); p. 500 supra (the hierarchical order-
ing inside a given court); p. 490 supra (comprehensive review on appeal).
66. See p. 495 supra.
67. The tendency of continental systems to treat legal and political issues as technical
problems has been noted in, e.g., R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 3, at 230; K. MANNIXEIM,
IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 105 (1949); H. SPIRO, GOVERNMENT BY CONsTITUTION 285 (1959). The
attitude that legal activity is more a craft and a technique than a political pursuit can be
traced to Greek antiquity, where the craft of lawmaking was considered antecedent to
political activity, just as in continental ideology lawmaking is subsequent to basic political
choices. H. ARENDr, TIM Hu,,AN CONDITION 173 (1959). Professionalism creates pressures
for specialization evn at the top of the hierarchy which explains why continental supremecourt judges sit in specialized panels. A general probleln-solving capacity does not suffice;
to allow litigants to supply technical knowledge ad hoc would be, in the continental view,a surrender of an essential aspect of judicial activity. Extreme specialization also exists in
continental law schools. A continental instructor teaching in as many 
fields as American
law professors would probably be viewed by his colleagues as a dilettante.
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action becomes unavoidable, it must be exercised sparingly, with
extreme moderation and preferably at the apex of the hierarchy.""
Moreover, this norm-creation by officials is supposed to proceed as
an activity guided by internal rules of the craft, that is, by auton-
omous principles of the normative order, and it should never be in-
fluenced by political, ethical or similar extrinsic values. The great
hostility toward decisionmaking on the basis of such considerations
clearly permeates the ideology of all continental countries. Indeed,
apocalyptic consequences are feared for the legal system as a whole
if officials in the law enforcement machinery are permitted to engage
in such unrestrained decisionmaking. The most dreaded consequence
is not the obliteration of the separation of powers, within which
policy questions are for the legislator to decide; after all, this prin-
ciple is often viewed, especially in the East, as a formal organizational
device of dividing functions. The primary fear goes deeper. It is
generally believed that decisionmaking divorced from the restraint of
the normative order brings the curse of uncertainty. Uniformity is
undermined and replaced by the wilderness of single instances. And
in the resulting chaos law itself, gradually but inexorably, dissolves
into politics.69
Notwithstanding important local variations, mechanisms to assure
conformity of behavior to these expectations can easily be identified
in all continental countries. It is probably not too far fetched to re-
gard even university training as a factor in shaping attitudes desirable
in the machinery of law enforcement. The view is there imparted
that the normative order contains, at least in embryonic form, the
solution to all problems. Broad panoramic vistas of neatly delineated
legal fields are offered to students, and the unmistakable emphasis is
probably still on acquiring knowledge of what has authoritatively
been said, rather than on the manner of thinking which generated
those authoritative pronouncements. 70 But, no matter what the in-
fluence of university training, the period of practical novitiate for
68. At the top, independent action is not limited to minor matters even in the criminal
law area. See H. SILVING, supra note 34, at 88.
69. This apocalyptic scenario is reflected almost verbatim in a 1954 decision rendered
by the West German Constitutional Court, itself a "marginal court," admittedly more
politicized than ordinary courts. See 3 ENTSCIIEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICIITS 225
(1954). And it is this vision which has prompted a famous French comparatist, looking
at American law, to declare in desperation that, with the weakening of the force of
precedents, law itself has been weakened. A. TUNC & S. TUNc, LE DROIT DES fTAT-UNIS
D'AMiRIQUE 163, 183 (1955). Judicial legislation is opposed also by the legal ideology of
Marxian socialist countries. See note 29 supra.
70. Elsewhere I have tried to define the continental mos jura docendi (the mode of
teaching law). See Damaika, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trial
and Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1968).
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official positions is in almost all systems an initiation to bureaucratic
techniques and modes of thinkingT 1 The successful socialization into
this world is then tested by entrance examinations, which are even
organized for aspirants to judicial positions. Finally, the desire of
career people to advance makes the system of promotions a very potent
weapon in enforcing conformity with expected official conduct.7 2
II. The Coordinate Model
A. General Characteristics
1. The Object of Coordination
Animating the coordinate model is the aim of reaching the decision
most appropriate to the circumstances of each case. Certainty of de-
cisionmaking is recognized as an important value, but is less weighty
than in the hierarchical model; what appears to be the best solution
in a particular case will not be readily sacrificed to certainty and
uniformity of decisionmaking. Consequently, the distinction between
saying that a particular decision is just and that it is in accordance
with the law cannot as easily be made as in the hierarchical model.
The cast of mind underlying these value preferences attaches great
importance to the rich variety of experience and is skeptical of at-
tempts to impress general structures on the complexities of life.
2. The Coordinate Organization
The desire for particularized justice requires that officials be close
to the concrete situations of life involved in the processing of cases,
and, of course, that they be free from outside constraints in con-
sidering equities. If achieving particularized justice were indeed the
sole concern in the coordinate model, the ideal system would be a
single layer of authority; but the need for a degree of uniformity is
recognized, and the necessary unification of policies cannot always
be achieved through the voluntary cooperation of autonomous of-
ficials. Accordingly, more complex structures of authority must be
composed.
71. See, e.g., R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 95 (West Germany and France); M.
CAPPELLE-r, J. MERRYMAN &: J. PERILLO, supra note 23, at 86, 104 (Italy).
72. See M. BaERDT, DER DEU-SCHE RiCHTER 7-21, 42-80 (1930) (masterful attempt to
sketch the psychology of the German judge). A common law reader would find this
portrayal quite inapplicable to the judiciary of his own system.
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When hierarchical structures of authority must be established, the
basic value orientations of the coordinate model mandate that the
ordering of authority be as mild as possible. Three attributes of
such a mild hierarchy are important for my purposes. Because of the
aversion to defining the relation of each official to the center of
authority, positions of sub- and super-ordination are not clearly de-
lineated. The resulting ambiguities and occasional overlappings are
willingly accepted as a necessary price for the fundamental commit-
ment to autonomous official powers. In keeping with the importance
of the first layer of authority, the inequality among officials on various
rungs of the hierarchical pyramid is not very pronounced; essentially,
they are all homologues with similar authority inherent in their po-
sitions. And lastly, when officials must be organized into a unit,
they do not thereby totally surrender their independence. Office and
incumbent are not fully separated. The unit does not become an in-
stitution divorced from the real people comprising it.
Because officials must tailor their decisions to the special, some-
times unique circumstances of individual situations, the desire to
predetermine the outcome of cases by precise and unbending rules
is repugnant to the coordinate model. This is not to say, of course,
that there are no preexisting standards for decisionmaking at all. Stand-
ards do exist, but they tend to be less precise and more flexible than
in the hierarchical model. The general theme of "official discretion"7 3
runs like an obbligato through all aspects of official activity. More-
over, it is consistent with the model to entrust crucial decisions to
independent bodies of laymen. In such a setting there is no need for
officials to make a record of all their activities, or to write down
and justify even minor rulings. And where written decisions and
reports appear warranted, standardization and regimentation of style
appear as unnecessary and irksome formalisms, perhaps not fully com-
patible with the dignity of official positions. Generally speaking, bu-
reaucracy in the coordinate model is rudimentary.
The structure of authority emerging from the foregoing brief sketch
generates quite different behavior expectations than those encoun-
tered in the hierarchical model. Obviously, the ideal official is not
a technical expert applying normative directives, irrespective of what
appears to him to be the best solution in the light of the circumstances
of individual cases. Decisionmaking is not a technical or administrative
problem with policy issues settled in advance, but rather involves
73. See note 6 supra.
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the more exalted and responsible activity of finding the best solution
to a social problem in light of the political and ethical values of the
decisionmaker.
This different role expectation in the coordinate model is reflected
in the requirements for official positions. The importance of both pro-
fessional training and a period of apprenticeship is minimized or to-
tally eliminated. A candidate for office is preferably an established
person who has made his mark in society, a problem-solver attuned to
community values. Since socialization to a bureaucratic world is not
necessary, even the highest positions may be entered laterally, that
is, by outsiders without previous experience in the machinery of crim-
inal justice.7
4
B. The Coordinate Model and Anglo-American Reality
As was the case with continental countries, important variations
that exist among common law jurisdictions must be acknowledged at
the very outset. Some countries, the United Kingdom being one, have
of late inaugurated changes bringing them much closer to continental
systems. Nevertheless, a general pattern can be discerned on many cru-
cial points in all Anglo-American countries, and it is to this general
pattern that my presentation is devoted.
1. Centrifugal Decisionmaking
a. Police and Public Prosecutors. It may be said with only a mod-
icum of exaggeration that both in England and in America a police
system, in the continental sense, hardly exists. Although professional
forces originated in the 19th century, they remain to the present day
74. The relationship of the briefly outlined coordinate model to Weberian typologies
is uncertain; Weber himself found that the common law system eluded his taxonomy. Yet
one might reasonably ask why the hierarchical and coordinate models are not polarized
with respect to the impersonal (or detached) style of exercising authority as Weber
similarly polarized the bureaucratic and various "traditional" types of authority. I think
this opposition is impossible, given the unusual constellations of personal involvement in
both models. Consider whether or not officials perform their duties as part of a permanent
occupation; the extent of lay involvement; the visibility of individual destinies (frequently
submerged in the neutral shelter of normative propositions); how many, and how crucial,
the decisions made at the level of original jurisdiction; all these factors seem to turn
one way. Yet other features confound this easy polarity: For example, the more elevated
the position of the autonomous decisionmaker the more likely the social distance to be
great between officials and ordinary persons, and this increases with an increase in
autonomy. And note the role of the aims of the criminal process itself. If one of the tasks
of the process is not only to consider people's activities but also their personalities (e.g.,
in an attempt to change them), officials tend to get more personally involved in the
processing of cases. Finally, I must point out the passive character of the ideal coordinate
judge and add that passivity can easily lead to aloofness. The variations smudge any
clear contrast between the two models on this point.
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deeply imbedded in local institutions and are in most respects wholly
decentralized. The jurisdiction of such police organizations as the FBI
in the United States and Scotland Yard in the United Kingdom re-
mains severely restricted.7 5
The situation is similar with respect to professional public prosecu-
tion. England still gets along without any real counterpart to public
prosecutors' offices, with the "system of popular prosecution" (actio
popularis) remaining the theoretical foundation." In most American
states, public prosecutors are locally elected officials with surprisingly
great and virtually uncontrolled authority. Even where state attorneys
general do possess some powers to coordinate local law enforcement,
these powers are seldom exercised. While the federal prosecutorial arm
is centralized, hierarchical subordination is negligible by continental
standards.77
b. The Jury. The common law jury is a classic example of an au-
tonomous decisionmaking body in the administration of justice. No
doubt, it is also a centrifugal force. Consider only the issue of jury
nullification. In the face of uncontroverted evidence, and in the teeth
of clear judicial instructions, the jury may bring in a verdict of ac-
quittal and thereby refuse to apply substantive law, whether centrally
imposed by the legislature or developed through judicial lawmaking.
The frequent justification for this power is that jurors must bring
to bear local conceptions of justice upon decisionmaking and adjust
the crude substantive criminal law to the circumstances of individual
cases.78 But even if the jury verdict is one of conviction and may
therefore be set aside, decisions as to fact, law and substantive justice
are so deeply entangled in the general verdict that continental review
can hardly be imagined.79
75. Police decentralization sometimes continues even beyond the municipal level, as
in New York City. See Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary Decentralized
System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1, 20 (1973).
76. See R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 120 (4th ed. 1964).
77. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 73-77 (1967).
78. Note, however, that the jury may most freely exercise this power of adjustment in
favor of the defendant. They cannot blatantly alter the substantive criminal law in order
to convict a defendant who would otherwise go free. The adjustment rationale is linked
to the challengeability of verdicts, and ultimately to the structure of power in the
criminal process. See P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 89 (1956) (England). For a recent judicial
discussion of jury nullification in America, see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F. 2d
1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Kadish & Kadish, On Justified Rule De-
partures by Officials, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 925 (1971); Note, Toward Principles of Jury
Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023 (1974). The centrifugal potential of jury nullification is almost
the same, even if it is viewed solely as a factual power rather than as a "legal right."
79. In addition, the inscrutable character of the general verdict has contributed to
the relatively unrefined nature of substantive criminal law. See S. MILoM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 361 (1969). While the continental variant of the jury
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It is true that in all modem common law systems, and especially
in the United States, jurors decide only a miniscule fraction of the
total volume of criminal cases. Nevertheless trial by jury remains an
ever-present practical possibility; more importantly for my purposes,
the jury is a paradigmatic concept around which ideologies and legal
sensibilities crystalize.
c. The Judiciary. It is well known that England was the first
Western country to develop uniform judicial institutions and to
achieve unity of law. This fact alone might seem to indicate that
the judiciary in common law countries is very far removed from the
decentralizing ideals of the coordinate model. Curiously enough, how-
ever, many striking features of judicial decentralization survive in
the modern adjudication of criminal cases. But before I turn to thege
features, let me engage in a temporary petitio principii and try to
explain this curious phenomenon.
A good starting point is to recall the unique features of, and limita-
tions on, the centralization of justice in medieval England. Discussions
of centralization and the unification of law customarily concentrate
on the operation of central royal courts. In an abridgment of a much
more complex phenomenon, one may say that English kings created
a single, rather undifferentiated system of courts of original jurisdic-
tion for the whole country, rather than a hierarchical structure. Be-
cause of the relatively small scale of operation and the very small
number of judges, it was possible to maintain in informal ways the
necessary degree of unity and consistency of adjudication. Judges
formed close-knit groups and regularly engaged in informal consul-
tation.80 No internal hierarchical differentiation or appellate system
was needed to achieve uniform decisionmaking by individual judges.8'
In discussing the administration of criminal justice, however, it is
wrong to focus on central royal courts at all. They were, after all,
created primarily for the legal needs of the dominant social classes,
and crime usually involved hoi polloi. The disposition of the great
bulk of criminal cases was entrusted to the local gentry-the justices
of the peace-who acted in partnership with local juries. No need
trial adopted a form of special verdict, see note 21 supra, hostility toward such verdicts
prevails in common law countries to the present day. For a recent example from Ameri-
can federal courts, see United States v. Spock, 416 F. 2d 165, 180-81 (Ist Cir. 1969); cf.
Heald v. Mullaney, 16 CpaN. L. REP. 1035 (1st Cir., Nov. 13, 1974).
80. On various techniques used to develop unity of law within royal courts, see M.
HALE, THE HisToRY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 251-52 (1820).
81. Consider how different this historical experience is from the continental develop-
ment, where the monarchs developed a many-layered bureaucracy and an appellate sys-
tem which reached local levels of administration, but were never strong enough to displace
local customs and unify the law.
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was felt for institutionalized forms of central supervision over the
work of local potentates. Various extraordinary legal devices, designed
to bring matters before the central royal judges, were seldom used
in criminal matters, and the administration of criminal justice re-
mained to the 19th century "a notable essay in decentralization."s2
Whether in royal courts or local ones, criminal cases involved one-
level adjudication. Quite naturally, then, the entire criminal process
became identified with the trial, and the conclusion of this stage
signalled the end of the criminal proceeding.83 This conception of
the criminal process, springing as it does from decentralization, has
not disappeared even now from Anglo-American law. Although ob-
scured by the twisting route in which its implications have been
circumvented or subordinated to modem needs, the importance of
single-level adjudication can be observed without great difficulty; it
is especially apparent in the interplay between the original adjudica-
tion and appellate review, which came relatively late to the common
law world. Let me present a few illustrations from American law in
support of this proposition.8 4
Because the notion has not been entirely discarded that the decision
of the trial court terminates the criminal proceeding, appellate re-
view seems to conflict with the guarantee against double jeopardy:""
Review appears as a "new jeopardy" rather than the continuation of
the original one.
Artificial constructs (such as the defendant's waiver) are invoked
to avoid this conflict. Similarly, the reconsideration of acquittals ap-
pears as a violation of the prohibition against successive prosecutions
for the same act. And, to the bewilderment of continental observers,
the defendant must obtain a stay of the trial court's decision pending
appeal.8 6
The lasting vitality of the notion of trial adjudication as final also ac-
82. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 169 (5th ed. 1956).
83. At common law, the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict prevented re-
consideration of criminal cases on appeal and retrial for the same offense. This practice
was reflected in the debate on the original draft of the Fifth Amendment. See 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 730, 781-82 (1789-1791).
84. It should be noted that England has in this century moved closer to the con-
tinental system of liberal review. However, this trend should not be exaggerated; for
example, the English appeal from questions of facts and from the sentence is not a
matter of right, but typically depends on leave of court. See R. ARGUILE, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 171 (1969). See note 95 infra. For some useful remarks in a generally neglected
area of the history of appellate remedies in common law countries, see L. B. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 14, 56 (1939).
85. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
86. From the continental point of view all Anglo-American appellate remedies would
be classified as "extraordinary" rather than "ordinary"; cf. note 15 supra. Since stays are
nowadays granted as a matter of course where decisions are reviewable, any distinction
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counts for the relatively limited scope of appeal. Leaving aside the
fact that acquittals cannot be appealed on any ground, consider the
comparatively severe limitations on the grounds for the defendant's
appeal. Both the factual findings and the sentence imposed can
hardly be challenged. Even -when error can be appealed, direct re-
consideration of the adjudication, as in the continental system, is not
involved. Following the pattern quite understandable in the setting
of the jury trial with its inscrutable general verdict, what is actually
reviewed is the propriety of the material submitted to the decision-
maker for decision, rather than his "correct" use of the material.87 In
light of the foregoing it is not at all surprising that the right to
appeal is not nearly so important in Anglo-American as it is in con-
tinental systems, and that it is generally not accorded constitutional
stature.88
The continued importance of original jurisdiction, with the ac-
companying lesser importance of the appellate process, invests the
Anglo-American judicial system with strong centrifugal tendencies.
Judges retain important autonomous powers typical of a decentralized
judiciary: Like the jury, they can nullify substantive criminal law;8 9
the unreviewability of acquittals gives them significant leeway in de-
ciding evidentiary issues; and the scope of their sentencing power is
astonishing by continental standards.90 As a result, centralization of
policies cannot be achieved nearly so easily as it is in the hierarchical
systems.
2. Mild Ordering of Authority9'
Beginning again with medieval England, we must recall that courts,
much as amoebae in the primordial biological soup, were for a con-
has been made virtually irrelevant for the purpose of obtaining a stay. But the concept
of original adjudication as a basis for res judicata and execution of judgment causes other
problems which have not been clearly resolved in the case law (e.g., the use of convictions
pending appeal for the purpose of impeaching the defendant at another trial).
87. Typical questions explored on appeal are whether the evidence was properly ad-
mitted, or whether the jury received proper instructions. The question of whether, given
the proper informational sources, the "correct" result was reached is not considered. By
contrast, in continental systems, this question too is subject to review.
88. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 18 (1956); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
89. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (purporting to
codify prevailing practice).
90. Continental lawyers would object to "provisional sentencing" (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
4208(b) (1970)) as placing unacceptable pressures on defendants to conform to whatever
the judge demands. Consider also the example given by D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 178 (1966). See Mueller & LePoole,
supra note 12, at 418 (on the continental system).
91. Because police forces and prosecutorial offices in Anglo-American countries are
seldom centralized, I may, perhaps, be allowed to neglect any minor hierarchies existing
in this area and concentrate solely on the ordering of the judiciary.
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siderable time quite undifferentiated. Some became stationed at West-
minster; others travelled around the country, possessed by 'humeur
vagabonde. Consistency of decision was maintained in informal ways;
little need was perceived for clear and rigid internal organizational
arrangements, and it was thought unnecessary to establish a judicial
hierarchy linking the center with local adjudicators. Consequently a
mildly hierarchical but quite complex court structure with somewhat
ambiguous organizational arrangements persisted until the court re-
forms of the last century.
92
It is striking that, notwithstanding the vast differences in the scale
of operation, many of the mildly hierarchical features of the British
court system exist in America. The most important of these features
must be examined in some detail.
Characteristically, a penumbra of uncertainty exists in the circum-
scription of judicial authority in the United States. It springs mainly
from the fact that American courts, including those in the federal
system, are not "creatures of legislation" in the continental sense.
Judges retain certain "inherent powers," independent of the legisla-
tive delegation of authority. Nor is there much anticipatory legisla-
tion concerning the division of authority, if only because even the
lower courts possess some "rulemaking" power.93 Indeed, legislation
on what could be termed judicial competence is so meager that, with
its blank areas, it appears to continental lawyers to resemble early
maps of Africa. Overlappings frequently occur in the jurisdiction of
courts at different levels. For instance, the trial judge, for a time,
following the announcement of his decision, shares with higher courts
the power to alter the judgment; moreover, a stay of execution may
be sought from either the court of original jurisdiction or from the
appellate court. As a final illustration of ambiguous relationships,
anathema to the hierarchical model, consider the power of federal
district court judges in habeas corpus proceedings to review state su-
preme court decisions, both in deciding whether to use the existing
record and in invalidating convictions of state courts rather than
merely disturbing the custody of prisoners based on such convictions.94
92. The latest reform, which went into force in 1972, brought the English court sys-
tem closer to the simple continental model. Nevertheless, carryovers from the past (such
as judges differentiated in title) remain within certain courts. See Grzybowski, Court Re-
form in England, 21 A'f. J. CoMP. L. 747 (1973).
93. Such rulemaking power, even if specifically delegated solely to the supreme courts,
is almost beyond the comprehension of most continental lawyers. Courts with which they
are familiar are mainly limited to issuing insignificant rules of order. Greater flexibility
and, consequently, uncertainty also stem from the freedom of some American courts to
refuse to consider a case falling within their jurisdiction. On the continent such a
practice would be a clear instance of "denegatio justiciae."
94. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1958).
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In accord with another distinguishing feature of the mild order-
ing of authority, trial judges are allocated many powers which a rigid
hierarchy would either vest judges at a higher level, or deny to the
judiciary altogether. An obvious example is the power to strike down
legislation as unconstitutional. 93 But even more remarkable is the
cause elebre of a federal trial judge determining-albeit in the first
instance only-the proper limits of the President's executive privilege.9°
Within the hierarchical model issues of such magnitude would never
be entrusted to the lowest judicial echelon.
In yet another respect the Anglo-American judiciary is accurately rep-
resented by the coordinate model: Individual judges, even when on
a panel, preserve their independence and identity. Thus, for instance,
the common law system has never accepted the idea, so typical of
hierarchical structures, that the court as a unit has spoken when a
judge belonging to its bench has rendered his decision. 97 And, when
a panel issues a decision, it need not speak with one voice; indeed,
a requirement that individual opinions be forgone would run counter
to basic ideas of the autonomy and dignity of judicial office. Con-
sequently judges are entitled to deliver individual opinions, even
if this implies, as in the Japanese fable of Rashomon, that the same
story is recounted from various standpoints and there is no discernible
opinion of the panel as such.
3. Preference for Flexible Rules
a. Police and Prosecutors. One of the most important tasks of the
police and public prosecutors is, of course, to stand as Cerberus at
the entrance gate of the criminal justice system. Their decisions con-
cerning which cases to admit and which to exclude are notoriously
difficult to regulate, especially through relatively rigid standards im-
posed from outside their respective organizations. Although a measure
of discretion, exercised in concrete circumstances, seems at once neces-
sary and unavoidable, continental systems have attempted to deny
both the police and public prosecutors freedom from normative con-
95. This power does not exist in the United Kingdom.
96. See United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974); Reynolds v. United States, 345
U.S. 1 (1953). Compare the less dramatic problem decided by the House of Lords in Con-
way v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910. A further example of powers that would be unacceptable
in the hierarchical model is the discretion of American judges to decide whether they
must disqualify themselves because of bias. A finding of such bias would in a hierarchical
system be made either by the chief judge or-more likely-by the higher court. For con-
trasts with the continental systems, see notes 41, 43 supra.
97. For example, the denial of bail or of a stay of execution by one judge does not
prevent his colleague on the court from granting it. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, stay
denied, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
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straints. Similar efforts are not apparent in Anglo-American systems.
Consider the decision of police officers whether to invoke the criminal
process: In the absence of a centralized police organization, there is
comparatively little concern with overall uniformity and thus only
minimal internal regulation exists. Moreover, existing standards can-
not be as effectively enforced here through internal supervision as
in a rigid hierarchical police structure.
What about external constraints imposed by the courts or the
legislature? Without broad participatory mechanisms such as the
victim's right to invoke the initial stage of the criminal process, there
is little effective control over police decisions not to investigate or
arrest. Thus the freedom of police officials from normative constraints
in deciding what matters to pursue, quite considerable in all systems,
seems somewhat more pronounced in Anglo-American countries.
08
While some will surely dispute this conclusion on the independence
of the police, for admittedly only nuances are involved in the dif-
ference, few would be prepared to deny that the Anglo-American
public prosecutor has considerably more freedom from regulation
than his continental counterpart. A typical American district attorney
comes quite close to the very ideal of an autonomous decisionmaker.
His decisions not to prosecute are practically unchallengeable, a cir-
cumstance all the more significant because the victim of the crime
does not have the right to institute formal criminal proceedings. Once
the prosecutor has decided to pursue a matter, there are comparatively
few legal constraints on his determination of how many charges to
squeeze out of the criminal transaction, 99 and there is very little law
on the question of whether charges pertaining to the same event must
be pressed together or seriatim.00 Moreover, prosecutorial freedom
in plea-bargaining is virtually total. Finally, since there is no cen-
tralized prosecutorial organization, the great freedom of individual
98. This, I believe, is true even of those police forces which have abandoned the
traditional "watchman" style and adopted the "legalistic" style of work. See generally J.
WILsON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOUR 140, 172 (1970). In the United Kingdom the
police prosecute most offenses and their exercise of "discretion" is generally accepted. See
G. Williams, Discretion in Prosecuting 3 CRIM. L. REV. (ENG.) 222 (1956).
My statement in the text should not be taken to imply that judicial control over police
on the continent is generally more effective; rather, internal constraints, and the more
pronounced role of the victim, are in part responsible for the comparatively less discretion
available to continental police. With his large automous powers in the area of excluding
evidence, the Anglo-American judge actually possesses stronger weapons to affect police
work than does his continental colleague.
99. Continental criminal law seems to be much more elaborate and specific. See H.
SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELEMENT OF CRIME 62, 175-97 (1967).
100. In most continental systems re-prosecution following a nolle prosequi faces some
double jeopardy obstacles. Unlike the common law system, where double jeopardy ideas re-
volve around the trial, continental countries attach jeopardy to criminal proceedings so that
problems appear earlier and continue until the appellate process comes to an end.
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prosecutors from normative constraints is not limited by internal reg-
ulations aimed at assuring the uniformity and consistency of decisions.
Such unfettered prosecutorial discretion is not very striking from
the comparative perspective, for substantial official leeway from pre-
cisely articulated standards can be encountered in many criminal jus-
tice systems. It is when we turn to Anglo-American adjudicators, i.e.,
the judge and jury, that much more considerable contrasts arise.
b. The Adjudicators. The Anglo-American adjudicator of criminal
cases may be characterized by his freedom from settled and precise
substantive law, and his flexible attitude toward rules, be they sub-
stantive or procedural.
In discussing the substantive criminal law, experts commonly assert
that problems belonging to what continental lawyers would call the
"general part" (such as principles of criminal liability, the unit of crim-
inal conduct, and the definition and sufficiency of charges) are in a
fluid and comparatively unrefined state.' 0 ' That this should be so
will not surprise anyone familiar with the spirit of what I have called
the coordinate model. Problems of criminal law are not authoritively
structured in advance, for it is feared that such attempts to capture
reality in the mesh of rules may hamper the attainment of particu-
larized justice. It is thought that the task of refining the law is done
best in the context of individual cases, by people both familiar with
the concrete details and attuned to community values. Unusual cases
that contribute so much to the complexities of the law are infrequent,
and prosecutors often decline to prosecute when such cases occur.10 2
101. One cannot deny, of course, that there is of late in almost all common law
countries a great deal of very sophisticated writing on substantive criminal law problems.
But this writing differs from the continental one in at least two characteristic respects.
Firstly, its major effort is directed towards the criminalization decision and purposes of
punishment, areas which, from the continental perspective, lie in a "meta-juridical" zone,
and are more appropriately the concern of politicians, philosophers and sociologists. One
finds relatively little analysis of the formal structure of substantive criminal law, partic-
ularly inspired by a desire to establish a sort of neutral algorithm for helping lawyers to
arrive at a given result in dealing with substantive criminal law problems. Secondly, where
analogues exist to the continental analysis of problems belonging to the "general part"
of criminal law, there is almost no agreement on the conceptual matrix from which one
can proceed to cumulative scholarship. Both in theoretical writing and in decisions, one
tends to go back to fundamentals. Using Kuhn's language, the discipline seems to be in
a "pre-paradigmatic" stage. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 11
(2d ed. 1970). Nor is this strange, if only in view of the fact that in common law
jurisdictions criminal law has only of late become the business of lawyers. See S. Mirsom,
supra note 79, at 353. If this is true of substantive criminal law, it certainly does not apply
to criminal procedural law. The latter is replete with arabesques of technical refinement
and is often exceedingly complex. See p. 527 infra. But, as we shall see, even in the
field of procedure and evidence, many important issues are left to the discretion of the
decisionmaker, and what I shall say about judicial attitudes toward substantive legal rules
applies equo ratlionae to the law of procedure.
102. Under the coordinate model no rational prosecutor would bring the defendant
to trial in the exceptional circumstances that constitute a borderline problem in the law.
A different result may occur under the principle of mandatory prosecution.
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Those cases that are brought within the criminal justice system are
usually left to the adjudicator's general verdict, from which concrete
standards simply cannot be distilled. 10 3 In sum, what to continental
eyes appears as a sorry state of affairs, resembling the charmingly
confusing Chagallian universe of freely floating objects, represents
in the setting of the coordinate model a perfectly natural and desir-
able arrangement.
Much more important than the relatively large areas of substantive
law that are not in fact governed by rules is the Anglo-American
adjudicator's disposition toward those rules that do exist. In contrast
to his continental counterpart, he finds little that is sacrosanct about
them and regards certain departures as perfectly legitimate. Let me
present a few examples. Of course, a judge in the Anglo-American
system can question the constitutionality of rules, and such rules are
therefore not inviolate; and it is obvious that where a judge can
decide these constitutional challenges, basic policy issues will often
surface. But even in those cases where constitutional objections to
rules are not raised, precedential or legislative standards will be dis-
carded or modified whenever they indicate a result contrary to the
adjudicator's strong beliefs as to the best disposition of the case. Where
departures from established rules lead to the acquittal of the defendant,
the adjudicator's decision usually cannot be challenged. And even
where his decisions are reviewable, his attitude toward rules will be
far from deferential, and departures from them may be regarded as
justifiable.
Generally, then, one can observe that rules in the Anglo-American
system are not much more than guidelines for average cases, guide-
lines susceptible of improvement and reconsideration in light of cur-
rent experience and the particular circumstances of each case. The
premise of this attitude resides in the desire to achieve particularized
justice.
But it is important for comparative purposes to note that, in this
concept of adjudication, decisionmaking becomes inevitably enmeshed
in concrete situations and even minor details. Legal questions can-
not be debated grosso modo, and efforts can hardly be made to de-
velop law as a system of interrelated legal standards. Adapting a fe-
licitous phrase from another context "a tradition of behavior is not
103. Frequently questions of determining facts and establishing normative standards
will be combined and treated as an issue for the jury to decide, as with negligence prob-
lems. The extent to which this arrangement discourages the development of substantive
law is a more general phenomenon. See David, Les caractres originaux de la pensde
juridique anglaise et amdricaine, in 15 ARCHiVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DO DROIT 6 (1970).
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susceptible of the distinction between essence and accident; to know
the gist is to know nothing."' 0 4
4. The Informal Style
The autonomous manner of exercising authority that is so charac-
teristic of the Anglo-American machinery of criminal justice must
inevitably decrease the importance of official documentation and bu-
reaucratic techniques. 10 5 There is in the Anglo-American criminal
process no real counterpart of the continental dossier; in fact, even
writing judicial opinions is regarded by many judges as an opportunity
for the expression of self, so that, by continental standards, many
judicial opinions appear more like products of littgrateurs than offi-
cial documents. And this applies even to periods in which the com-
mon law followed what Llewellyn has termed the formal style. 0 6
In this scheme, it would not make sense to suggest that decision-
making should place great reliance on official documentation. In-
deed, much of the law of evidence is designed to prevent such an
occurrence. Summaries of testimony or of visits to the scene of crime,
for example, assume the character of lifeless bureaucratic residues of
reality, always defective, often spurious, and therefore such evidence
is normally inadmissible at trial. The best substitute for the viva vox
as a basis for decisionmaking at the trial is the full transcript, for
this comes closest to reproducing the full complexity of reality that
is so crucial to adjudication in the coordinate model.
5. Behavior Expectations
As a result of differences in the respective authority structures, the
objective role expectations of Anglo-American officials present a sharp
contrast to those engendered in continental systems. Because the goal
of the common law process is justice within the individual case, re-
104. M. OAKEstorr, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 128-29 (1962). Ben-
tham's remark that common law, conceived as a system of rules, is "a thing merely
imaginary" is thus not as preposterous as it might initially appear. J. BENTHAM, A
COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 125 (C. Everett ed. 1928). See A. SIMPSON, supra note 31,
at 88-99, for a modern and quite persuasive argument that common law cannot be under-
stood as a system of rules.
105. In this area, some professionalized Anglo-American police forces come closer to
the bureaucratic continental style than do other official bodies. Of late, efforts are
observable to make American judges state the basic reasons for imposing a particular
sentence. See ABA MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 10, in ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENC-
ING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, TENTATIVE DRAFT 333 (1967).
106. The "chasse-croisd" between more or less formal styles can be detected even
within the "common law tradition", but such shifts are negligible when constrasted to
the continental idiom. Compare decisions of the French Cour de Cassation with examples
of the formal style offered by K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 306 (1962).
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course by its officials to substantive values, such as social policy or
ethical considerations, is part of the very essence of their activity.
Taking refuge in the neutrality of the legal craft and its universe of
norms, while closing one's eyes to what appears desirable in the light
of concrete circumstances, is not fully compatible with the dignity of
the office. The ideal official in the Anglo-American system is not
so much a professional expert as a wise problem-solver, attuned to the
values of the community.
Mechanisms to sustain such behavior expectations can, at least in
America, be readily located. The first influence is exerted by the
system of legal education.
107
For instance, panoramic vistas of fields of law, conceived as an
orderly normative whole, are not offered at all in law school, for
they would appear as hollow immensities of dubious value and of
an uncertain relationship to reality. The open-endedness of issues is
stressed from the very first day of school, so that freshmen will be
socialized to a world in which there are few mooring places and little
certainty. Most of the time in class is spent debating policy issues,
making mental efforts to resolve them under professional guidance.
After law school, there is neither a practical apprenticeship nor an
entrance examination for official positions, although such events are
crucial to the shaping of the sensibilities of continental officials. High
office can be entered without any prior bureaucratic experience;
candidates for official positions, even at the lowest level, are prefer-
ably prominent persons who have behind them careers as politicians or
lawyers. Finally, because incumbents of official positions are estab-
lished people who do not differ widely in importance and prestige
on the various echelons of the hierarchy, the desire for advancement
does not appear to be as pronounced.
The result of such behavior expectations and training is that the
personnel manning the Anglo-American machinery of justice are rela-
tively unwilling to tolerate the low profile and multiple constraints of
bureaucracy. Officials are generally forceful and willing to make in-
dependent decisions; thus, even at the lowest echelons, few officials
107. Until recently some officials in the Anglo-American system of justice were not
even required to be lawyers. In modern times university legal education has been required
increasingly, for at least the judicial office, but there are still well known exceptions,
such as justices of the peace and some county prosecutors. Moreover, within Anglo-
American law schools, specialization is not nearly as narrow as in European universities,
and the path to teaching positions is not as arduous as in most continental countries. See
H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AmERIcA: COURTS, LAWYERS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1965); David,
supra note 103, at 5.
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display a typically bureaucratic mentality, while at the top it is not
surprising to find "charismatic" personalities. 108
III. The Structure of Authority and the Conventional
Typology of Criminal Proceedings
Two models of authority structure have now been presented. If
they successfully capture some essential aspects of the contrast between
continental and Anglo-American systems of criminal justice, the next
inquiry then becomes their relationship to the conventional dichotomy
between adversarial and nonadversarial types of procedure, where this
latter set of terms is used to focus on comparisons of process at the
trial stage.10 Are authority structures and processing styles independ-
ent, or is one set of models, either of authority structure or processing
style, ultimately subordinate to the other? This is an intriguing but
very difficult question. Fortunately, for the purposes of my article, I
need not explore all analytically possible or historically known com-
binations of authority structure and processing style in the administra-
tion of criminal justice. Nor need I consider the labyrinthine problem
of which combination is analytically the best match. Instead, my
attention centers on the actual combinations that present themselves
in the limited field of my comparative inquiry. Accordingly, in the
present part of the article I propose to consider only those issues
that arise when the coordinate model is paired with adversary pro-
cedure, as is the case in Anglo-American countries, and the hierarchical
model is matched with nonadversarial proceedings, which occurs in
continental jurisdictions.
A. The Judge at Trial
When the positions of the continental and Anglo-American judge
are viewed from the different perspectives afforded by authority and
process models, a curious puzzle emerges. The Anglo-American judge
108. In using this term, defined in the Weberian sense, I refer particularly to the
judiciary. Notice in this connection how little specialization is encountered at the apex
of the judicial hierarchy in Anglo-American countries. Charismatic leaders are not tech-
nical specialists; the necessary technical knowledge for their pronouncement is supplied
to them ad hoc by the litigants, masters, or amici curiae.
109. I have elsewhere criticized the use of these models to explain the contrasting legal
systems. See Damaika, supra note 1, at 561-65. Nonetheless, the descriptive force of the
traditional dichotomy is not limited to the trial stage. It also illuminates the prosecutorial
role before trial. In the adversary system, the prosecutor is driven into a relatively
pronounced opposition to the defendant in anticipation of the trial. The police in Anglo-
American countries similarly act in anticipation of an adversary trial with high eviden-
tiary barriers to conviction. One factor that explains differences in police behavior between
continental and common law systems is the greater divergence in the latter between what
the police actually know and what can be introduced as evidence at trial.
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has great autonomous powers, but his ideal stance is that of a rela-
tively passive umpire of the adversary process. His continental coun-
terpart is less autonomous, but assumes an active role. It seems strange
that the strong is expected to be passive, while the weak is supposed
to be active; indeed, many would be inclined to view this combination
as an analytical mismatch.
Attempts to explain this bizarre merger must await an analysis of
those factors that affect the actual choices of structure and style." 0
In this section, I shall inquire into the features of this curious com-
bination in an effort to illuminate the relationship between models
of authority structure and models of trial design.
Let me begin by first taking the Anglo-American side of the com-
parison. The passive posture of the judge is historically novel"' and
far from being a general description of the judicial office. Instead, it
applies only to a limited number of procedural contexts and to a re-
stricted class of issues. Judicial passivity is the rule only during the
guilt-determining phase of the trial, and there serves as the norm
only with regard to the framing of the subject matter of the proceed-
ings, the collection of evidence, and the presentation of proof." 2 Even
in this limited segment of their activity, Anglo-American judges are
not rigidly restricted: If a judge believes that abiding by his ideal
role will adversely affect the proceedings or poorly serve the public
interest, he will usually abandon his detached stance and vigorously
intervene in the conduct of the trial."3 And even though much of
110. See p. 529 infra.
111. See note 156 infra.
112. By passivity in framing the subject matter of proceedings I refer to the arrange-
ment whereby the parties themselves determine which claims and defenses to press or to
waive. In recent times some Anglo-American jurisdictions have permitted the judge to
raise certain defensive issues. See note 137 infra. Where this has happened, a departure
from the adversary model must be acknowledged.
By judicial passivity in collecting evidence I mean the absence of requests by the judge
that the parties furnish an evidentiary source, e.g., that a witness be called. Most theoreti-
cal writers would agree that if the judge goes beyond merely suggesting to the parties that
particular evidence be produced, he is deviating from the adversary style. But see F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5-7 (1965). That judges should be passive in the presentation of
proof is correctly viewed as less central to the ideal of adversary proceedings; asking
questions of witnesses is compatible with the adversary style. United States v. Liddy,
Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 8, 1974); United States v. McCord, Crim. No. 73-2252
(D.C. Cir., Dec. 12, 1974) (see opinion of court at 17-22). But if the intensity of such
judicial activism exceeds a certain point, the judge clearly deviates from his proper role.
Finally, it is frequently forgotten that the stance of passivity applies a fortiori to the jury.
113. Some of these deviations from the passive role can be explained by a desire to
correct. the malfunctioning of the adversary system. Adversary proceedings require an
approximate equality between the parties in order to function properly, and if the balance
of advantage is seriously affected, the judge may intervene. If his redress of the balance
helps the defendant and results in acquittal, his conduct is unreviewable. If he supports
the prosecution and conviction follows, the propriety of such assistance is of course sub-
ject to review. See e.g., United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1967). As
we shall see, however, not all judicial activism can be explained along these lines.
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this intervention is technically limited to suggestions to the parties,
these "suggestions" will typically be heeded, for both parties will be
reluctant to risk unfavorable and often unchallengeable judicial de-
cisions on other matters. Judicial passivity, however, is recognized as
an ideal posture only in limited situations. In many phases of the
criminal process, such as pretrial hearings, in camera examinations,
and the sentencing stage, passivity and aloofness come to an end. In-
deed, at these junctures in the proceedings Anglo-American judges oc-
casionally assume outright inquisitorial postures that are without
counterparts in modern continental systems."1
4
And no one would be more surprised at such powers than the con-
tinental judge at trial. It is true that he is the source of most pro-
cedural activity: He is responsible for determining the subject matter
of the proceedings,"I and for securing all evidence needed for the as-
certainment of the truth. During the proceedings, he not only presides
over the taking of proof, but also originates the bulk of questions."16
The continental trial judge, however, must expect superior review
of all his rulings as a matter of course, and is rigidly restricted by a
network of rules and customary practices. He has much less inde-
pendence from normative constraints than his common law counter-
part, and also much less power over the parties and other participants
at the trial.117
It follows from the foregoing that the conventional characteriza-
tions of judicial activism in the two systems are of limited explanatory
value. An analysis based on differences in the type of authority can
provide a greater insight into a broader range of judicial activity
114. The prosecution for the break-in at the Watergate headquarters of the Demo-
cratic National Committee provides a controversial example. Judge Sirica decided that
it was in the public interest to proceed to an inquiry beyond the prosecutorial charge. He
refused to accept the guilty pleas (see N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 1; at 24, col. 6)
and imposed unusually harsh "provisional" sentences (up to 40 years). See United States
v. Liddy, Crim. No. 73-1564 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 1974) (see MacKinnon, I., dissenting, at
16-17). This second measure produced results: one defendant decided to talk, and the
Watergate scandal was brought to the door of the White House.
Ever since the 19th century reforms, continental judges, whether trial or investigative,
have had neither the authority to exceed prosecutorial charges nor such weapons as
"provisional sentencing" to put pressure on defendants to cooperate. More generally,
observe the broad equity powers of the Anglo-American judge in civil cases. It is the
denial to the continental judge of comparable, flexible powers (especially of supervision)
which explains more than anything else the absence of the device of the trust in the
continental legal system.
115. He is, of course, confined to the prosecutor's charge, but within its limits the
judge must raise all relevant issues; and thus there are, for example, no "affirmative"
defenses in continental law.
116. For limited exceptions, see Damalka, supra note 1, at 525 n.38.
117. There is hardly a counterpart in continental systems to the contempt powers of
the common law judge. Parties may also seek judicial disqualification more easily than
in the common law system. See, e.g., §§ 22-31, GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1974, at 11, col. 1 (request for removal of Judge Sirica).
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than can the traditional dichotomy between active and passive roles.
Indeed, this is the case even in those areas to which the traditional
view is applicable since it must admit numerous deviations from
the type of judicial behavior one would expect on the basis of the
traditional dichotomy.
B. The Complexity of Procedural Issues
Still another seeming anomaly appears when the two models of au-
thority structure are related to the adversarial and nonadversarial
styles of procedure. It will be recalled that officials in the coordinate
system are free from precise and stringent legal standards, and do
not regard themselves as legal technicians. But the adversary trial
in which they operate has a complex structure; much of the law of
evidence and procedure is intricate, replete with technicalities. In
continental systems the situation is just the opposite: Nonadversary
proceedings are comparatively simple, there is relatively little law of
evidence," s yet the process unfolds before officials who perceive
themselves as legal technicians and willingly assume normative con-
straints.
In attempting to explain this puzzle I must separately consider three
issues. First, I shall determine which authority structure is likely to
generate more complicated procedural law. Second, I shall inquire
whether procedural complexity reduces the decisionmaker's freedom
from normative constraints, and whether procedural simplicity leads
to the opposite result. Finally, I shall make a few comments on the
relationship between the degree of the technical complexity of law
and the need for the advance training of officials, for it is this rela-
tionship that establishes the different self-perceptions of officials in
the two systems.
Which model of authority structure is more likely to create legal
complexities? The hierarchical model is possessed by the desire for
certainty and uniform decisionmaking. But certainty and uniformity
cannot be achieved without ordering, and the latter in turn implies a
degree of abstraction. One cannot establish order without rearranging
and eliminating whatever does not fit the order-determining prin-
ciples." 9 Those who think otherwise may be likened to a gardener
trying to create a formalized French garden, while refusing to trim
and eliminate individual plants.
118. But see note 57 supra.
119. Examples of this are the preference for brief summaries of relevant facts rather
than full transcripts and the neglect of factual description in judicial opinions.
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The coordinate model, with its strong attachment to individualized
justice, is less willing to neglect the particular in the interest of or-
dering.120 Denuding individual cases of those circumstances irrelevant
to ordering principles appears as artificial as French topiary art seems
to a devotee of the loose and free English gardening style.'121 But this
too comes at a cost. The coordinate model must accept a relatively
high degree of complexity in its law as the price for a relatively low
degree of order in its normative structure.
122
There is another circumstance bearing on the issue of procedural
complexity. Where, as in the coordinate model, the adjudicators are
autonomous and much of their decisionmaking is largely unchal-
lengeable, procedural problems arise and assume great importance
which are quite secondary or even irrelevant within other systems. At
trials to an autonomous adjudicator one cannot afford to be lax in
regard to potential sources of error in adjudication, since they often
cannot be corrected through review. Quite naturally, then, assuring
the adjudicator the proper informational input before he decides the
case assumes central importance. This is the stage at which parties
believe they can have control over the process. Intertwined with the
question of guilt, structural questions as to the admissibility of evidence
and the proper scope of counsel's behavior have to be litigated before
120. It was Burke, I believe, who saw the characteristic feature of liberty in the
complexity of institutions and a danger of tyranny in their simplification; cf. G. DE
RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 99 (1959).
121. The horticultural metaphor is not so farfetched. The classical French garden
strikes one as highly rational, just as rationalist attitudes underlie the hierarchical model.
By comparison, the English garden seems less orderly, which accords with the Weberian
idea that nonbureaucratic organizations are of low rationality. Note also that "the heated
controversy during the eighteenth century between defenders of the formalized French
garden and the partisans of the looser English style must surely be considered one aspect
of the fight for liberalism against the rigid autocracies of the past." R. ARNHEIM, Order
and Complexity in Landscape Design, in TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF ART 125 (1972). The
reader should remember this aesthetic parallel when, in the next part, I turn to the
problem of ideologies supporting procedural models.
122. As far as the desire for logical symmetry and clear ordering of the law is con-
cerned, England and continental European countries began to drift apart long before
the age of codification on the Continent. Of coure, I cannot offer concrete proof of the
greater simplicity of continental criminal law in the precodification period; I can only
invite the reader to compare a mid-17th century German book on criminal law with an
early 18th century English work on the same subject. Compare D. CARPZOV, PRAcTICM
NOVA RERUM CRIMINALIUM IMI'ERIALIS SAXONIcA, supra note 11, with AV. HAWKINS, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN (1824). Bear in mind that Carpzov was not a mere theorist, comfortably
removed from decisionmaking, but a busy judge in Leipzig. On the other hand, Hawkins
was not solely a product of empirical education, but a Cambridge graduate as well. The
historical explanation of the greater ordering and intellectual symmetry of continental
law is very complicated. Emphasis on different patterns of legal education as an explan-
atory factor goes back at least to Weber. See M. WEBER, RECTSSOZIOLOoEl 197-201 (1960).
For a recent exposition of this view in English, see Coing, The Roman Law as Ius Com-
mune on the Continent, 89 LAW Q. REV. 505 (1973). In addition, the development of
judicial administration was radically different in England than on the Continent. For
the curious English development, see S. MILsom, supra note 79, at 32, 37, 72, 79.
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the trial is over. In this scheme it is not unusual to find a symbiosis
of autonomous decisionmakers and a caste of highly skilled technical
experts whose main purpose is to make sure that the adjudicator is
exposed to the proper informational material.1
23
What is the situation in the hierarchical model? Because all de-
cisions are in principle reviewable, a heavy emphasis on prophylactic
rules would be misplaced and undesirable. It would only burden the
consideration of the merits with "collateral" issues. 24 Moreover, with-
out such a burden, the role of continental lawyers is correspondingly
different, and their primary orientation is toward the substantive reso-
lution of the case.
It is thus quite natural for the coordinate model to generate more
complicated procedural law than does the hierarchical model. This,
however, should not be taken to mean that the freedom of officials
in the coordinate model is consequently more narrowly circumscribed.
Rather, the attitude of such officials toward procedural and eviden-
tiary norms is decisive. In the coordinate model, rules can legitimately
be departed from and the review of such departures is comparatively
limited; accordingly, procedural and evidentiary norms are not so
compelling as they seem to be in the hierarchical model. Further-
more, even if the prevailing disposition toward legal propositions
were the same in both models, there is a point beyond which in-
creased complexity of law, especially in loosely ordered normative
systems, objectively increases rather than decreases the decisionmaker's
freedom. Contradictory views can plausibly be held, and support found
for almost any position. These characteristics are, of course, much
more prominent in the coordinate model than in its antipode.
These characteristics establish, and in turn are reinforced by, the
different self-perceptions of officials operating within the two models.
It is significant, and not paradoxical, that adjudicators in the pro-
cedurally less technical hierarchical model regard themselves primarily
as technical experts, while their counterparts in the procedurally com-
123. It is tempting to suggest that judges in the traditional common law administra-
tion of justice are legal experts assisting the actual decisionmaker, rather than decision-
makers themselves. The jury is the autonomous adjudicator, while the essential function
of the judge is to supervise the flow of information and to supply the jury ad hoc with
any necessary technical knowledge.
124. Technical consequences of this different orientation are legion. For instance, the
idea of "mistrial," so important in the Anglo-American system, is insignificant or un-
known in continental countries; the notion of "fair hearing" is much less central.
Moreover, the prejudicial error concept of procedure has developed quite differently in
the two systems. Generally speaking, continental systems appear much more reluctant than
common law systems to disturb a substantively "correct" adjudication for procedural
reasons.
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plex coordinate model view themselves more as general problem-solvers
than legal technicians. If the individual contours of processed cases
are decisive, as is the case in the coordinate model, advance knowledge
of the criteria for decision is relatively unimportant. More helpful to
the decisionmaker is the knowledge that can best be obtained ad hoc,
in the context of litigation. The important residual of the official's
own technical expertise is the normatively flexible area of practice
and evidence, a rather unlikely subject for advance systematic study.
More relevant to the operational demands of a coordinate system
than a technical knowledge of norms is a general problem-solving
capacity, social imagination, and similar nontechnical qualities.
The hierarchical model represents quite a different world. Its
normative universe seems surveyable and its ordering principles, man-
ageable information. As the importance of the particular circum-
stances of cases decreases, the gaining of advance knowledge of norma-
tive criteria for decision becomes a more realistic and fruitful effort.
In sum, a more hospitable environment is provided for beliefs, be they
illusory or not, that what is involved in making decisions is essentially
a technical problem of applying predetermined legal standards.
Once again, however, my discussion of one issue has raised another,
and this time broader, question. How did these curious mergers of
processing style and authority structure come to pass? Is it possible
that their actual choice in continental and Anglo-American countries
can be related to a common determinant? It is to this question that
I shall now turn.
IV. The Criminal Process and Attitudes toward Political Authority
A. Procedural Models and Political Ideology
It would betray a great deal of innocence to assume that the genesis
of procedural systems reduced essentially to a more or less consistent
derivation from the tenets of prevailing political ideology. The latter
seldom, if ever, inexorably lead to concrete procedural choices. Fur-
thermore, many problems of criminal procedure are matters of little
controversy between ideologies, and even those ideological considera-
tions that are relevant may be deemed less important than counter-
vailing factors.
Consider the role of continuity of tradition. It was certainly of
great importance in the gradual evolution of the common law pro-
cedure, exposed, as it was, to a variety of historical cross-currents.
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But even instances of ideologically motivated innovations in con-
tinental procedural history do not offer examples of procedural stand-
ards and practices written on a tabula rosa, but rather on a palimpsest
from which the past was never completely erased.
Nevertheless, even if ideological tenets cannot causally explain spec-
ific combinations, it is worthwhile to look for possible connections
between ideology and particular choices of processing style and or-
ganizing authority. In discovering affinities between ideology and crim-
inal procedure we are actually canvassing ideological arguments ad-
vanced in support of existing procedural arrangements and in oppo-
sition to their change.
1. Parental and Arm's Length Criminal Justice 
2 5
Theoretical writers have attempted to articulate ideological orienta-
tions that provide an explanation for basic choices in structuring pro-
cedural authority and devising procedural arrangements.1 2 In Ameri-
can scholarship, these efforts have led to two polar procedural ide-
ologies. One, purporting to capture the fierce agon of Anglo-American
procedure, is predicated upon the belief that an irreconcilable conflict
between the individual and the state exists in the administration of
criminal law. Because state officials cannot be trusted and consum-
mate deviltry on their part cannot be ruled out, the best procedural
design is one in which the individual and the state engage as ad-
versaries in a highly formalized battle. The goal of criminal justice
must be narrow, limited to the meting out of punishment for specific
conduct; if it went beyond that, an unacceptable invasion of the
individual sphere would occur.
Opposed to this ideology is the view that there is a basic con-
gruence of interests, and perhaps even mutual love, between the in-
dividual and the state. Officials harbor parental emotions toward
the defendant: He is viewed by them as an "erring member of the
family" who has to be reconciled with and reintegrated into the com-
munity. Accordingly, state officials need not be mistrusted, they need
not be limited to a passive role in the proceedings, and the ample
powers they exercise need not be confiscated because of occasional
abuse. Finally, the objectives of the system may be broad, encom-
passing even educational purposes.
125. The description in the text derives from K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 106, at 444;
Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
126. For an illustration of continental efforts in this direction, see G. FoscHINI, I
SISTEMA DEL DIRiiro PROCESSUALE PENALE 226-32 (2d ed. 1965).
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This polarization of procedural ideologies, no matter how illuminat-
ing in other contexts, is unsuitable for the purpose of contrasting
modem Anglo-American and continental criminal procedure. Al-
though it cannot be denied that the parental ideology fits some sys-
tems known to history, these procedural systems can be found either
in tribal cultures or in those modern societies that attempt to restrain
antisocial conduct independently of state authority. While in the
first case no state has yet developed, 27 it is claimed in the second that
the state is moribund, and new reactions to unacceptable behaviour
are harbingers of the stateless future.128 But from the moment the
state appears as a factor of any significance until such time as it
actually withers away, the parental ideology may rightly be regarded
with some circumspection, for it may provide a rationalization for
the most brutal kinds of governmental oppression.
Leaving aside some recent but more controversial illustrations, con-
sider the example of medieval inquisitorial procedure. Because me-
dieval society was strongly collectivistic, and the role of government
was as yet unlimited, two basic consequences of the parental ideology
were present: pronounced togetherness, and a strongly "intervention-
ist" approach to deviant behavior. Even so, the authority exercised
by officials in medieval inquisitorial proceedings can hardly be ex-
plained as benevolent paternalism. The defendant did not look to the
judge for guidance and protection, nor did the judge perceive the
defendant in statu pupillari. The social distance between the typical
defendant and the judges, or the heinous nature of the crime, usually
prevented any real empathy among them. In serious cases the judges
seldom even saw the defendant, invoking "acta inquisitionis" to
cover a void of emotion. Thus, at least from our modem perspective,
the relationship between the defendant and state officials cannot
meaningfully be studied sub specie amoris.
29
127. When the state has appeared but is still weak, the activity of its officials is
generally limited to the supervision of contests between private individuals. Thus, while
the state is still embryonic, criminal proceedings develop closer to a "battle" model than
to a "parental" model.
128. Indeed, this is part of the ideological justification for East European "com-
radely courts" with jurisdiction, inter alia, over minor crimes. A system close to the
parental ideology has recently been proposed for dealing with minor crime in American
urban communities. See Danzig, supra note 75, at 15, 42. However, this proposal may be
justified more as an abdication of state authority than as its death throes.
129. However, there are indications in contemporary sources that such "parental"
justifications were attempted. Punishments for some minor crimes were claimed to have
been in the miscreant's own interest (poenae medicinales). And even in proceedings
against witches and heretics, investigators were sometimes instructed to seek the de-
fendant's confession so that he or she could be reintegrated into the community. See
Bartolus de Sassoferrato in J. HANSEN, QUELLEN UND UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHIcHTE
DES HFXENWAHNS 66 (1901). T. CAMPANELLA, CIVITAS SOLIS POETICA (1643), offers an ex-
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Briefly, then, the polarization of parental and arm's length ide-
ologies must be rejected for my purposes. Rather, to understand the
ideological roots of the coordinate and hierarchical models, I shall
contrast some unique features of classic English liberalism with several
aspects of prevailing continental ideologies relevant to the administra-
tion of criminal justice.
2. Classic English Liberalism as a Source for Procedural Choice
a. Limited Government and Diffusion of Authority. Although it
is hazardous to talk in general terms about the main themes of classic
English liberalism, the views on political authority attributed to this
tradition can be considered fairly representative of it. And it is pre-
cisely these views that appear quite singular from the standpoint of
those continental ideologies which prevailed at the time when modem
political institutions were being shaped.130
Within the conceptual horizons of classic liberalism, it seems as
if society does best without the state at all. The state should be called
in and its influence felt only in times of crises, when something goes
wrong in the "self-governing" society; government is solely an arbiter
in cases of conflicting interests or disputes. Under no circumstances
may government legitimately impose specific beliefs upon citizens;
the state is not entitled to guide and educate them in accordance
with its own visions about the good life. This is paternalism-one of
the strongest aversions of the classic liberal credo.
13'
Two main reasons are usually advanced for this liberal idea of limit-
ed government. The first and fundamental explanation reflects a gen-
eral attitude of skepticism: Since no belief or idea regarding human
affairs is exclusively or demonstrably true, it is unjustifiable to im-
pose any such views on other people. The second reason for the ideal
of limited government is related to this agnostic epistemological posi-
tion: Since no one knows what is objectively best, each individual may
be presumed capable of making and must be allowed to make his own
ample of a man who conceived a "parental model" of criminal justice while he languished
in the dungeons of the Spanish Inquisition; cf. R. MARCIc, GESCHICHTE DER RECHTSPHIL-
OSOPIE 281 (1971). But it is not likely that such intentions to reclaim the criminal were
seriously held. A totalitarian state may, however, succeed in transforming society to the
degree where parental ideologies become widely accepted; cf. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note
106, at 447.
130. In what follows I deal only with the division of governmental power among
competing power units. It stands to reason that this arrangement in the political system
can coexist with great, even monopolistic power concentration in social and economic
areas.
131. Cf. J. Locxa, Two Tar, Tss ON GOVERNMENT, SECOND TRaArsSE § 60, at 173
(1960).
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choices in life, 32 no matter how strange or even foolish they may
seem to others.
But even the most extreme brands of classic liberalism recognize
that there are areas of social life in which continuous state interven-
tion cannot be avoided. Where this is the case, and the administration
of justice is an example in point, great concentrations of power must
be prevented and the diffusion of authority is regarded as a political
imperative. There are two ways in which authority may be fragmented.
The more obvious method is to distribute it along a horizontal axis,
among powerholders at the same level. It is this first, Montesquieuan
form that has virtually monopolized the attention of both continental
and Anglo-American political theorists, particularly with regard to the
upper echelons of governmental structures. But while it became part
of the dominant ideology in the English-speaking world, the doctrine
of the "separation of powers" never really took hold in Europe, insofar
as it implies the creation of independent power centers which balance
one another. 33 A second way of fragmenting authority has received
much less attention and is usually encountered in discussions of fed-
eralism. Yet this fragmentation is an important phenomenon, and I
believe, quite typical of the intricate weave of the English political
tradition of strong local self-government. It involves the allocation of
authority along a vertical axis, in its "scalar" aspect; in this way,
subordinated structures of government are vested with substantial au-
tonomous powers and hence share a measure of supreme authority with
the highest level of government. A mosaic of local power centers is
thus created. But, as a result of the horizontal division of authority,
the powers of local potentates are rather narrow, and abuses by one
may be checked by the refusal of others to cooperate. It is this second
form of diffusing authority, leading to minimal centralization, that
132. See C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 244 (1962).
133. Conceived as a separation of legislative, judicial and administrative functions, the
separation of powers may be said to be more rigorous on the Continent than in Anglo-
American countries; the judiciary is denied lawmaking powers, and the legislature is
refused any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. But, if separation of powers is viewed as
calling for the establishment of independent power centers which check and balance each
other, the model becomes alien to continental political theories. Considered spurious by
Rousseau, it is generally rejected because it both conflicts with the necessary unity of
government and creates animated political standstills. The locus classicus on legal aspects
of the continental variant of the separation of powers is still 2 C. DE MALUERG, CONTRI-
BUTION A LA TH9OR!E G NiRALE DF L'kTAT § 1, at 23-34 (1922). This famous French legal
theorist thought the idea of checks and balances (freins et contre-poids) was tolerable in
America solely because it was not extended, he mistakenly assumed, to the states, but was
limited to the federal government. Id. at 22 n.13. On the enthusiastic American accept-
ance of the doctrine of separation of powers, see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMER-
ICAN REIUBLIC 151, 604 (1969); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 47, 51 (J. Madison). In socialist
countries of Eastern Europe, separation of powers is rejected on familiar Marxist grounds,
as a cloak to hide the essential unity of the ruling class.
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is in perfect harmony with classic English liberalism but quite alien
to any influential continental political ideology.13 4 Indeed, this second
diffusion of authority constitutes one of the most striking features of
the English political culture.
It would be incorrect to understand "liberalism" only in the context
of its modern variants. The antipathy of classic English liberalism to-
ward state intervention and strong central government may not be
the attitude most congenial to the implementation of substantive lib-
eral values. Indeed, a centralized state may further the development
of liberal values, and it is by no means clear that central tyranny is
necessarily worse than the tyranny of local potentates. Accordingly,
the classic English liberal attitudes toward the state are not a neces-
sary ingredient of the modem liberal credo; instead, they must be re-
garded as a matter of historical contingency, so that hostility toward the
state is a product of ideological inertia, remaining from the days when
power had not yet passed into liberal hands. Freedom, to classical
liberals, was mainly freedom from the state, and there were only "a
few presentiments" that the state in liberal hands could accomplish
tasks for which spontaneous social organizations and private enterprise
are insufficient.
13
b. Procedural Implications of Classic Liberalism. It is hardly neces-
sary to ask whether the ideology of classic English liberalism favors
the coordinate over the hierarchical model of authority structures in
the criminal process. The preference for the former follows easily
from the general liberal distaste for concentrated power, and more
particularly from its attachment to what I have called the vertical
fragmentation of authority. Let me therefore turn to the relationship
between the liberal ideology and the conventional adversarial and
nonadversarial models of processing style.
In introducing this theme it is useful to step back from the usual
focus for a moment and imagine the full concentration of procedural
authority in the hands of only one official. An example of such a
monopoly of power is the figure of the inquisitorial- investigating
judge. He decided on his own initiative what cases to process, and
134. Exceptions to this rule can only be found in some brands of socialist ideology
(e.g., the Yugoslav "self-management") which, in an attempt to disperse authority and
decentralize, led to legal reforms. Excepting the area of federalism there is little political
or legal literature on the vertical fragmentation of authority. Much more can be learned
from writings in the area of business organizations, particularly those discussing the
problems of vertical integration of firms as opposed to "autonomous contracting" in the
market. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLIcA-
TIONS (forthcoming 1975).
135. See G. DE RUccIERO, supra note 120, at 60, 135, 368.
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possessed full authority to determine any issue which in his opinion
required examination. Using our modern concepts, one may say that
the prosecutorial, defense and adjudicative functions were merged
in this role. 130 The 19th century continental reforms of criminal pro-
cedure resulted in the dissolution of this concentration of power and
led to the separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Fol-
lowing these reforms, the continental judge could proceed only on
the motion of a prosecutor, and the subject of his inquiries was limited
to the offense described in the prosecutor's charge. Although motivated
by independent reasons, this separation of functions is consistent with
continental political ideas on the separation of powers. But, unlike
the Anglo-American system, continental procedural systems refused
to go beyond this point.
The additional narrowing of judicial functions in the Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal process cannot be justified by any influential continental
theory of the relationship between the state and the individual. How-
ever, it may be understood with reference to classic English liberalism.
Let me show this by considering a number of examples.
The proposition that the defendant be given a monopoly over most
defense issues, and be permitted to discharge them as best he can
without judicial interference, finds no support in prevailing conti-
nental political ideologies, and is generally alien to continental legal
culture. 37 Classic English liberalism provides an easy justification for
this arrangement: The defendant is presumed to know what is best
for him, and since no one else can establish better knowledge, no
official has the right to impose his views on the defendant. Within
the adjudicative function that exists after the prosecutorial and de-
fense functions have been severed, a further fragmentation may take
136. Where the judgment was rendered by a panel of judges, as was the case in
serious matters, a similar concentration of functions took place. Deciding essentially on
the basis of the investigative dossier, the panel was supposed to act simultaneously as
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges.
137. As part of his official duties the continental judge must raise all defense issues
for which there is some support in the case. Any other arrangement is viewed as risking
the conviction of an innocent person. The trend in modern Anglo-American law is away
from the radical position tinder which the defense has a full monopoly over defense
issues. For instance, some jurisdictions authorize the trial judge to raise the issue of
insanity on his own initiative. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, Grim. No. 1631-71
(D.C. Cir., Oct. 22, 1974); Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But
it is significant that the drafters of the ALI Model Penal Code rejected this arrange-
ment as "too great an interference with the conduct of the defense." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.03, Comment at 194 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Another consequence of divesting the judge of defense functions is that the collection
of exculpating evidence becomes basically a private enterprise; cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). This laissez-faire atmosphere so pervades the Anglo-American system that
the advent of "public defenders" for the indigent defendant may be viewed by many as
a considerable innovation.
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place if the defendant so desires. The crucial function of determining
guilt can be taken away from state officials in all but minor criminal
cases and vested in a group of citizens. And if the latter refuse to
convict the defendant, no matter what result seems to be mandated on
the basis of the ascertained facts and applicable law, their decision
is in this respect sovereign.138 Thus the Anglo-American judge's role
begins to resemble the ideal role of the state in the liberal vision
of society: Both state and judge are transformed into arbitrators, su-
pervising societal conflicts. In sum, then, the limited functions of
the Anglo-American judge, so central in the adversary type of trial,
reflect both the idea of limited government and the horizontal di-
vision of authority. 39 But because authority is also vertically frag-
mented, the judge retains great autonomous powers, and, free from
a comprehensive superior review, can depart from his theoretically
narrow role whenever necessary to achieve justice.
The classic liberal ideology, however, provides support for more
than the fundamental matrix of the adversary type of trial. Again
consider the defendant's role. Continental lawyers often marvel at the
degree to which crucial decisions in the Anglo-American system of
criminal justice are withdrawn from state officials, and consequently
withdrawn from legal norms and rational and objective decisional
standards.
It is the operation of the defendant's choice, rather than of an
inexorable procedural rule invoked by the state, which determines
the mode of processing to be applied in his case. If he decides not
to oppose the charge, an extremely informal "adjudication by consent"
will typically follow, no matter how serious the offense involved. Where
charges are contested, the decision whether to have a trial by jury or
138. I should reiterate at this point that I am concerned with possible liberal justifica-
tions of existing procedural arrangements, rather than trying to prove that such arrange-
ments actually derive from liberal tenets. The division of functions between judge and
jury antedates liberalism by centuries.
139. The horizontal division of authority is also noticeable in the denial to the Anglo-
American judge of full authority to decide whether an arrangement between the prosecu-
tion and the defense accords with the public interest; under existing law, the judge
shares this authority with the public prosecutor. It can be argued that under a pure
adversary model the parties should be sovereign in their arrangements, the prosecutor
acting as sole guardian of the public interest. A similar issue on the role of the judge
also arises in connection with acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea. See United States
v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970).
Some scholars claim that this narrowing derives from notions about the best allocation
of functions between parties to the dispute. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (1965). It is
unclear, however, why such notions about optimal allocation are entertained-as far as
criminal matters go-only in the Anglo-American system.
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judge is again usually made by the defendant.1 40 On the Continent,
by contrast, separate types of processing are chosen in accordance with
predetermined rules: the more severe the offense, the more elaborate
the proceedings. There is very little that the defendant can do to
change this arrangement, and nothing at all in case of serious crime.'
4 '
This division of roles also applied to the transplanted jury system
which, once imported, soon suffered a decline. Throughout the jury's
checkered history on the Continent, the legislature specified the
catalogue of crimes, usually only of the most serious kind, which were
triable to a jury. The defendant had no say on the matter, no waiver
of jury trial was permitted, for the provision was jus cogens. Similarly,
if the Anglo-American defendant refuses to be represented by counsel,
the system cannot force him to do so, no matter how grave the charges,
and despite the fact that optimal functioning from within the ad-
versarial mode requires lawyers on both sides. The defendant has
the moral right "to stand alone in his hour of trial."'142 This notion
is rejected by continental systems, although defense counsel is there
not nearly so crucial as in the Anglo-American system. Continental
law mandates that, if certain serious criminal charges are involved,
the defendant must be represented by counsel irrespective of his in-
sistence on acting pro se.1
43
As a final illustration, consider the problem of illegally obtained
140. In legal theory, the decision concerning a jury trial does not reside exclusively in
the defendant. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 25 (1965) ("We find no constitu-
tional impediment to conditioning a waiver [of jury trial] on the consent of the prosecut-
ing attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply
that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury..."). In fact, however, his
choice is usually honored. See Note, Government Consent to Waiver of Jury Trial under
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 65 YALE L.J. 1032 (1956) ("Ordi-
narily government consent to waiver may be obtained as a matter of course...").
141. Where a minor crime is involved, the defendant can influence the mode of proc-
essing to some degree. Remote counterparts to pleading guilty have a long tradition in
some continental countries. See, e.g., the French Ordonnance Criminelle, Titre 14, Art. 19
(1670) (commentaries to this provision, applicable solely to minor crime, can be found
in A. ESMEIN, supra note 11, at 275). This situation persists in modern systems. For a
lucid presentation of such devices in West Germany, see J. Langbein, supra note 51.
But where serious offenses are involved, the case must go to trial even if the defendant
fully confesses. All that, the defendant's confession will effect is the shortening of the
relevant criminal process. Nor can the gains to the system be compared with those arising
from the avoidance of the Anglo-American trial. For some empirical data on this problem,
see Casper & Zeisel, supra note 21, at 146.
142. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (statutory
right under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)). On the constitutional right to pro se representation,
see Faretta v. California, 43 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S., argued Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 73-5772).
There is, however, no question about the pro se right in England, where failure to respect
it is a ground for appeal. See The King v. Woodward, [1944] 1 K.B. 118.
143. Continental systems usually speak of "necessary defense" (notwendige Jerteidigung).
See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CRIM. LAW PROJECT OF N.Y.U., GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 140 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR art. 49, in H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROcEDURE (2d ed. 1972).
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evidence. Continental systems are generally less hospitable to the idea
that reliable but illegally obtained evidence should be rejected. Those
exclusions that take place are accomplished as part of official duties
and, where this occurs, even defendant's consent will not suffice to
allow the use of illegally obtained evidence.14 4
Continental lawyers observing the Anglo-American criminal process
have voiced fears that entrusting so many decisions to the defendant
threatens his interests and may lead as well to objectively false de-
terminations. They note, for instance, that if a defendant-for some
reason best known to himself-fails to raise a defense that is both
complete in law and supportable in fact, the verdict may go against
him and an innocent man thereby be convicted. And they add that
when issues of such strategic importance depend on the defendant's
will, officials may be tempted to pressure defendants into waiving
their rights to the costlier modes of processing.
These and similar objections carry decisive weight in the conti-
nental legal system, and find support in the prevailing views of the
relationship of state and individual. In the framework of classical
liberalism, as expressed, for example, in 19th century utilitarianism,
these objections seem far weaker and too rigidly dogmatic.14a
I could easily continue to enumerate procedural arrangements char-
acteristic of the Anglo-American system of criminal justice that are
justifiable in the context of classic English liberalism 146 but anti-
thetical to all influential continental ideologies. What I have said so
144. Seldom will this be expressed in statutes or codes, for it is considered as self-
evident in light of continental "legal science." Occasionally, however, it is expressed in
legislative texts. See, e.g., GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 143, § 136a
(1965).
145. The marriage of classic liberalism and utilitarianism is usually taken for granted.
See, e.g., Smith, Liberalism, in 9 INT'L ENCYc. Soc. Sci. 276 (1968). It is, however, a
marriage with many strains, especially if classic Benthamite utilitarianism is involved.
See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22-23, (1971) (especially at 29, 33). Using the concepts
developed by Professor Packer, one is tempted to say that utilitarianism tends toward
the "Crime Control Model," while classic liberalism (including some newer accretions with
welfare state overtones) espouses the "Due Process Model." See H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs or
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). But on the issue discussed in the text, both marital
partners, liberalism and utilitarianism, seem to concur, albeit on different grounds.
146. There is one important difference in continental and Anglo-American thinking
about procedural arrangements at trial that is independent of classic liberalism, especially
in its historically oldest "negative" strand that was inspired by reactions against monarchi-
cal oppression. In approaching the desirability of particular procedural arrangements,
continental and Anglo-American lawyers often do not have in mind the same paradigmatic
criminal case. The former imagine a case of relatively routine nature in which the
hypothesis of guilt is more likely than that of innocence. The paradigm for the latter is a
very close, almost Buridanian case. It is true that this difference, if indeed it exists, can
be related to liberal fears of governmental persecution of the innocent, but there is a
better explanation. All cases come to trial under the continental system, and the pretrial
investigation screens out those in which the evidence is insufficient, thus increasing the
proportion of cases in which gtuilt is a likely hypothesis. Cases coming up for trial under
the common law system of pleading are not routine and may well be mostly "close cases."
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far, however, is enough to show that classic liberalism would imply
both the preference for the adversarial over the nonadversarial style,
and the choice of the coordinate over the hierarchical model.147
B. The Genesis of Divergent Attitudes toward Authority
Although it is evident that continental and English liberal political
theories diverge with respect to governmental authority, the source
of this divergence is elusive and undetermined. Putting this question
in an Anglocentric form, why is it that the Continent is alone in
its tolerance of concentrated authority? It has been fashionable, par-
ticularly in the last century, to seek the answer in the peculiarity of
the English Volksgeist.148 But few people nowadays would maintain
that ideologies develop independently of their social context, even if,
in their philosophies, they attribute autonomy to ideas. It is more
likely that we may account for different perceptions of authority by
studying the dissimiliar developments of political institutions in Eng-
land and on the Continent. The roots of these developments are, of
course, hidden in the recesses of history. But at least some of them
are related to the different manner in which feudalism developed
and was overcome on the Continent and in England. Renouncing,
therefore, my mainly analytic perspective, I shall in this last part
venture a brief historical excursus.
It is well known that feudalism appeared somewhat earlier on
the Continent than in England. Many circumstances combined to
make the early variant of this socio-economic structure very disrup-
147. The parallels between the liberal ideology and procedural arrangements should
not be urged too far. First, liberalism as a political ideology is not without internal con-
flicts. It seems to vacillate between the desire to limit the role of the state and the desire
to seek governmental intervention to enhance individual opportunities. Social ills may
sometimes be the consequence of oppressive governmental control; at other times, the
result of lack of control. Depending on historical circumstance, the balance between the
two strands can cast a classical liberal as either a progressive or conservative.
Second, many characteristics of the Anglo-American administration of justice depart
from liberal tenets. Consider only the fashionable emphasis on treatment and rehabilita-
tion. Modeling people according to certain images connotes state concern with persons
rather than their activities, and runs contrary to classic liberalism. However, liberalism
affected substantive ideas as well as criminal procedure. Especially in debates on the
limits of the criminal sanction, classic liberalism is still vital. See Note, Limiting the
State Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. Cm. L. Ray. 605 (1970).
148. These views are, I think, effectively criticized by R. CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF
TIHE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 86 (1973). Similar criticism can be levelled against attempts to
explain the many parallels between Anglo-American and classical Roman criminal proc-
esses in terms of alleged similarities between the Roman and English "national spirits."
A better explanation of these parallels is the similar pattern of structuring political
authority in the Roman and English political traditions. Both political cultures display
many characteristics of the coordinate model: an elaborate system of checks and balances
among autonomous magistracies, duplication of functions, reluctance to abolish obsolete
institutions, and slow, adventitious growth instead of deliberate intervention.
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tive of order and unity. The Continent was dismembered into a kalei-
doscope of virtually independent provinces, controlled by local feudal
lords and only loosely bound into larger political units. In the days
of slow communication and rudimentary administrative mechanisms,
effective rule from a distant center was virtually impossible. As time
passed, strongly entrenched regional and local political institutions
crystallized. It was thus difficult for continental rulers to create ex-
clusive states out of the existing loose confederations. To effect this
gradual extension of control, rulers dispatched officials to occupy
provincial and local positions of authority as agents of the central
power. At first these officials were weak and perforce respected local
customs and privileges. As they gained strength, however, a centralized,
stratified bureaucracy emerged. 149 In areas where feudal fragmentation
had caused disruptions and frustrated economic development, the
emerging central rule became associated with order and stability. The
final product of this development was the continental absolutist
monarchy. Even progressive people who opposed such absolutism be-
lieved in the need for strong central rule; when the French Revolu-
tion destroyed the old order, for example, royal administration was
expanded rather than dismantled.150
It was in these contexts that continental attitudes toward authority
were shaped. People became adapted to strong central rule, regarding
it as both antagonist and savior. Liberal cynics would probably pre-
fer to say that people became insensitive to the evils of concentrated
power in the way that Mithridates became immune to poison: by
taking it in increasing doses.' 5 ' Those who rebelled against power
were few, and went to the extreme of viewing the state as intrinsically
evil. 152 But even when their minds dreamed forward into the ideal
149. See J. STRAYER, supra note 36, at 50-56. The development in Italy was different
from the French, and, some may think, deviating from the continental "hierarchical
model", at least as far as the administration of the Communes is concerned. However,
even within city-states, more than one layer of judicial administration existed, and
judicial office was viewed as a delegated rather than as an autonomous function. See
Calisse, A History of Italian Law, in 8 CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 145-46, 165
(1928). The Swiss experience is singular and cannot be discussed here.
150. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN REGIME (1933); L. HARTz, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA 44 (1955).
151. Continentals accept as natural many governmental measures that seem repre-
hensible to An&lo-American liberals, e.g., the role of identity cards. Moreover, many
procedural possibilities in continental systems lie unused out of respect for authority
(e.g., some broad testimonial privileges).
152. It is well known that most continental liberals were not as implacably hostile to
the state as classic English liberals. They believed in the need for state intervention and
unity in order to prevent confusion and anarchy. Freedom to them lay not in independ-
ence from the state, but in turning it to liberal purposes, in taking an active part in it.
See G. DE RUGGIERO, supra note 120. Only a few continental liberals regarded the state
as such with antipathy. See, e.g., W. VON HUMBOLDT, IDEEN ZU FINEM VERSUCHE DIE
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stateless future, their imaginations did not envision an individualistic
society. In their view man was ultimately a social being, a Gattungs-
wesen. Significantly, when these continental rebels inspired mass
movements, the exigencies of the revolutionary present were said to
preempt visions of the stateless tomorrow. The concentration of power
was declared an historical necessity, many social institutions were
absorbed into the fabric of the state, and the stateless future was
placed "on the other side of history."
The English experience was quite different and in some ways rather
unique. Prior to the advent of feudalism, local notables were all but
wiped out by successive invasions of the British Isles; the Norman
kings, who imported feudalism, were sufficiently farsighted not to
grant large, compact landholdings to their vassals. As a result, strong
local power centers did not emerge. There was also the crucial cir-
cumstance of small scale, which allowed direct and very effective royal
intervention throughout the land. There was no need for kings to
establish a large central bureaucracy as a transmission mechanism be-
tween them and local government. Local notables, not strong enough
to be feared, worked in the local administration without pay, thereby
eliminating a major expense for the Crown.153
Notwithstanding geat royal power, however, English feudalism man-
aged to establish a measure of what we would now call constitutional
restraint on its monarchs,'a 4 and this in the context of a feudalism
that was not nearly as disruptive and centrifugal as its continental
counterpart. The chaotic War of the Roses was, admittedly, succeeded
by a brief intermezzo of Tudor absolutism, but this was neither so
rigid nor so enduring as its later continental counterparts. The fight
of the middle class against feudal restrictions resulted in the suprem-
acy of the Parliament and a generally less radical break with the
not-so-abhorrent past than was later the case in France.
This moderate social change preserved many ancient forms of gov-
ernment by nobility and arrested the development of modem bureauc-
racies. An essentially local administration by notables prevailed in
England well into the 19th century; 55 indeed, because the age of
administrative reforms in England was also the zenith of laissez-faire,
GRENZEN DER NVIRKSAMKEIT DES STAATES ZU BESTIMMEN (1851). Some continental outcries
against the state, such as the Nietzschean so wenig Staat wie m6glich (as little state as
possible), were placed in such ambivalent intellectual contexts that they were even ex-
ploited by totalitarian ideologues.
153. See j. SmA-YER, supra note 36, at 36-37, 47.
154. See W. ULMANN, THE INDIVIDUAL AND SocIErY IN THE MIDDLE AcEs 51 (1966).
155. For additional details, see L. NAMIER, ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 3-41 (2d ed. 1961).
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strong centralization was never truly considered as an alternative to
many increasingly obsolete administrative arrangements. While some
reforms affected the administration of the criminal law, many archaic
procedural ideas, some of them vestiges from the days of the emerging
state, suddenly accorded with the prevailing philosophy of individual-
ism and limited government. Rather than being rejected, they were
refurbished and incorporated in the system of criminal justice which
slowly assumed its present contours.D6 "The importance of being
antiquated"' 57 was thus vindicated with the second turn of the his-
torical spiral. In the whole of the English experience, there is little
that could have conditioned people to accept a strongly centralized
bureaucratic machinery as a conditio sine qua non of societal order.
Transplanted to America, the classic liberal ethos fell upon fertile
soil. Feudalism as a socio-economic order was skipped altogether, and
strong centralist rule was never part of the national experience. While
the distant English rule inspired colonists with resentment of au-
thority, the overthrow of English dominion did not require the strong
arm of concentrated power. In addition, such circumstances as the
frontier society, the natural abundance of resources, and the religious
legacies of 17th century Protestantism, facilitated the introduction of
liberal dispositions toward authority into the American political cul-
ture to an extent astonishing even to English 19th century liberals.
People never became mithridated by concentrated power.' 5 ' It is only
around the middle of the last century that the partnership between
liberalism and diffuse authority came under great strain. The crises
156. Of course, some important differences between the criminal process on the Con-
tinent and in England antedated the 19th century reforms. The 13th century papal pro-
hibition of clergy participation in trials by ordeal triggered the divergence of the two
systems, although they had begun to drift apart even before. This prohibition created a
vacuum in the administration of justice which was filled by different procedural ar-
rangements in England and continental Europe. For modern perspectives on this develop-
ment see R. CAENECEM, supra note 148, at 84.
The adversarial style of processing criminal matters is largely a product of the early
19th century. Until the middle of that century, the pretrial phase of the process was
essentially a type of judicial investigation along inquisitorial lines conducted by justices
of the peace. Nor was the trial an adversary battle of counsel. Lawyers would seldom
appear for the prosecution, and defense counsel were not admitted in ordinary felony
cases until 1837. In this situation the judge called witnesses and examined them, and in
the century prior, had also interrogated the defendant. For an account of such judicial
trial examination, see Fielding's picaresque novel Tom Jones. H. FIELDING, THE HIsToRY
OF TOM JONES, book 8, ch. 11 (1906).
Evidentiary and procedural finesse, so characteristic of the adversary process, could not
develop in the context of a trial without lawyers. Indeed, until the modern era, there were
no law reports of criminal cases. For a realistic account of the criminal process prior to
modern times, see S. MitsoM, supra note 79, at 353-74.
157. The phrase has been borrowed from another context in R. CAENEGEm, supra note
148, at 84.
158. See L. HARTZ, supra note 150, at 39-50; G. WOOD, supra note 133, at 150-51, 604.
Perceived needs for order, so important for the opposition between the coordinate and
hierarchical model, may be related to the experience with political authority.
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of slavery and secession forced many liberal minds to turn to central
authority as a guarantor of liberal values. It is true that, as our cen-
tury progresses, many tenets of classic liberalism increasingly clash
with new realities, but no alternative social theory has emerged as a
dominant ideological force.
The administration of criminal law is one area in which the con-
tinued vitality of liberalism is very much in evidence, notwithstanding
strong counterpressures generated by the modern system of mass
criminal justice. 159 And the specter of imperious and oppressive gov-
ernmental inteference in the life of the individual is still a powerful
generator of procedural choices.
Epilogue
In the first part of this article, the "hierarchical" model of au-
thority was outlined and used to illuminate salient aspects of the
continental procedural system. In the second part, the "coordinate"
model was sketched and its explanatory power demonstrated by con-
sidering actual Anglo-American criminal processes. This description
showed that the two systems differ significantly in the extent of the cen-
tralization of authority, the degree of its rigidity, the choice between de-
terminative and flexible rules, the importance attached to formality
and documentation, and the types of behavior expectations held by
government officials.
Using this framework I next examined the connection between
authority structures and criminal processing styles. Finally, I left the
legal arena altogether and trespassed into the realm of political ide-
ology. Although my narrative has not proceeded in an historical
vacuum, I have not intended it primarily as a study, however super-
ficial, of the genesis of legal phenomena. Rather, I have suggested
some fundamental conceptual relationships that link certain political
ideologies and particular forms of criminal justice systems.
Even if my unpardonable abridgment of history has persuaded the
reader that the singular characteristics of the Anglo-American crim-
inal process can be related to unique liberal dispositions toward gov-
159. Pressures of modern mass criminal justice to discard liberal ideology were
brilliantly described by H. PACKER, supra note 145, at 149-73, in his depiction of the
"Crime Control Model." Some procedural reforms instituted by the Supreme Court, during
the 1960's, imposing positive dities on the government to help the indigent, may arguably
be interprete as a departure from classic laissez-faire. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
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ernment authority, the reader who likes to take sociological theory
with his history will probably want to continue the search for more
basic factors. My discussion has already unveiled a larger problem
by implication. Throughout this article I have treated continental sys-
tems as a group, lumping together Western democracies and Marxian
socialist countries. This I have done in the belief that great dif-
ferences among various continental systems of criminal justice pale in
significance when contrasted with the Anglo-American. Does my po-
sition imply that, at least as far as the organization of procedural
authority and the type of processing style are concerned, attitudes to-
ward political authority are more important sources of procedural di-
vergences than the social and economic structure of society?10° This
larger question comes tantalizingly close to my theme, but I must
leave it aside because of the great complexity of problems involved
in answering it. Thus, there is no denouement to issues raised by
this article, and I can unfortunately offer no deeply satisfying syn-
thesis to the reader patient enough to follow me to the end.
160. This is inseparable from the fascinating and urgent problem of how the distinc-
tion between continental and common law legal systems relates to the opposition between
capitalism and socialism.
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